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A b s t r a c t
In the wake of the bipolar order, a political and strategic 
reconfiguration of Europe is necessary that reflects the current 
international atmosphere. G erm any’s reunification has prompted a 
reappraisal of that country’s economic, political, and security role in 
Europe. Germany is a central element to any new European order 
due to its geography, economic and political clout, and its unique 
historical position between East and West.
In light of recent changes, the relevance of neofunctional 
integration theory has been revived. The intergovernmental 
conferences at Maastricht on economic and political union 
dem onstrate that f u n c t i o n a l  and poli tical  “ sp ill-over” are 
com plemented by cu l t i va ted  “ spill-over”—the use of diplomacy to 
upgrade the common interest of integrating members. This 
refinement lends neofunctionalism a new relevancy in light of 
Europe’s em erging order.
G ermany has demonstrated a dramatic break with its 
militaristic past and demonstrated its com mitment to the institutions 
of the West. The German polity has undergone a fundamental 
change and the country has become a stable liberal democracy. Its 
com m itm ent to restructuring European economic, political, and 
security institutions to incorporate all European nations should 
mitigate the fears of Germany’s neighbors of a return to its 
hegemonic, militaristic past.
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I n t r o d u c t i o n
On the threshold of the 21st century, the nations of Europe face 
an array of challenges. Some are familiar to European history; the 
violent outbreak of ethnic tensions in the Balkans and the suspicions 
surrounding the unification of Germany are visitations to Europe's 
historical animosities and rivalries. Other phenomena, however, are 
new to the post-war European experience: the level of economic 
potential and political aspiration of the new Germany are two of 
several new circumstances which provide prospects for a more 
prosperous and peaceful Europe.
The demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent disapproval 
of her influence in Eastern Europe thrust Germany into an unfamiliar 
and uncomfortable position at the head of the European integration 
movement. Overnight, Germany changed from a subordinate, 
partitioned member of the Atlantic alliance to a politically unified 
and economically dominant Central European power. As a result, 
Germany finds itself adjusting to its new, more assertive role in 
Europe. It must focus its efforts in three particular areas. First, 
Germany must consolidate internal reunification processes and 
launch the reconstruction of Eastern Germany's economy. Second, it 
must assuage the fears of its neighbors of a return to a hegemonic 
and militaristic Germany by remaining committed to the European 
Community (EC) and its institutions. Finally, due to its size and 
economic power, Germany must take a lead in aiding the construction
2of a new European security order which accurately reflects the 
cu rren t in te rna tional environm ent.
The role of Germany today is unique in Europe. In addition to 
its geographic location, it is also the only country which is directly 
involved in both the Western European process of in teg ra tio n -  
through its participation in the EC—and the Eastern process of 
economic and political reform —through its experience in the 
reconstruction of Eastern Germany. Thus, a Germany which has been 
the focal point of European conflict for most of the 20th century is in 
an unprecedented position to promote cooperation between East and 
W est.
Under the bipolar geopolitical structure, both East and W est 
Germany were objects of superpower policy. Reunified Germany, 
however, must adopt a foreign policy that reflects its stature as 
Europe's dominant regional power. It will assume such a role by 
continuing to strengthen and work within the framework of the EC, 
the organization that has been Germany's ticket to international 
respectability and presently assuages European fears of German 
re v a n c h is m .
E u r o p e 's  P o l i t ic a l  L a n d s c a p e
The current European political landscape is muddled. The 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the liberalization of Eastern 
Europe have created a power vacuum in Central Europe which can 
only be filled by a reunified Germany. This is so for two reasons.
First is the ascendency in the global arena of economic issues over
3security issues. The countries of the European Community and 
Germany in particular are now less concerned about an invasion by 
Warsaw Pact forces and more concerned about an invasion of 
economic refugees from the East. Consequently, economic support 
flowing from the West to the East is essential. Despite the economic 
burdens of unification, Germany has the greatest capacity to provide 
technical and economic support. The second reason is that 
unification enables Germany to fulfill its primary foreign policy 
dilemma and thus exercise greater control over its foreign policy 
decisions. Freed from the yoke of subordinate partnership in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and possessing Europe's 
strongest economy, Germany must assert itself both politically and 
economically. As one commentator has said, "...united Germany 
cannot behave like a big Switzerland, wealthy and neutral. As a 
normal state of its size and wealth it must make its voice heard and 
its presence fe lt ."1
The rapid and unexpected consummation of German unification 
has created anxiety throughout Europe. Fears of a united Germany 
are manifold: that Germany will return to its militaristic and 
revanchist past; that decades of careful integration in the W est will 
be lost as G erm any’s interests drift eastward; that Germany will 
eschew its role in the Atlantic Alliance for neutrality; and that the 
economic might of Europe’s largest population will dominate the 
continent. The extent of this concern is evident in the West as allies 
and Comm unity members simultaneously espouse support for
^ c k a r t  Arnold, "German Foreign Policy and U nification," I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
A ffa irs ,  67, 3, 1991, p. 462.
4unification while keeping a watchful eye on German actions in the 
East. Newly liberalizing Eastern European countries clamor for 
German financial aid and technical assistance with uneasy 
recollections of Nazi occupation.
While it is clear that the new Federal Republic of Germany is a 
different country politically, socially, and culturally than the Third 
Reich, some concerns about Germany’s prospective new role are 
justified. The demise of the bipolar order—felt most dramatically in 
Europe—has solved one German Question and replaced it with a 
series of others. Many of the institutions and organizations with 
which Germany is associated were predicated on confronting the 
"East-West" struggle and ensuring the development of a peaceful, 
cooperative German state. For the NATO, the EC, and the "Helsinki 
process," German reunification has prompted a difficult reappraisal 
of their role in post-Cold W ar Europe.
This thesis seeks to demonstrate that a reunited Germany will 
not be a threat to the progress toward European integration in the 
past 40 years. To be sure, Germany will no longer be content to 
occupy a subordinate and passive role in the international 
community. This will mean a Germany that asserts itself 
diplomatically and economically as never before in the post-war era. 
However, such assertiveness should not be construed as a return to 
Germany's bellicose past. It will rather be a simple function of the 
country 's historical dynam ism  and of its remarkable success in 
reconstituting German statehood from the ashes of World War II.
5The level of integration attained in Western Europe since the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957 is unprecedented. While this integration 
may fall short of fulfilling the federal dream of many ardent 
European federalists, it is also far more successful than its most 
outspoken critics imagined. For Germans in particular, the 
opportunities presented through membership in the EC have 
dem onstrated the promise of regional integration: it has been 
Germany's ticket to international respectability and influence.
The breakdown of the bipolar order was a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for German reunification. While the post-war 
order collapsed around them, Europeans were terrified at the 
prospect of German reunification. As events rapidly outpaced 
appeals for a cautious approach to reunification, Europeans 
grudgingly acknowledged the German right to self-determ ination.
The critical support of the United States gave the Germans a 
powerful ally and dem onstrated that Germany had attained equality 
within the alliance as a partner in leadership.
After years of subordinate status within the W estern alliance, 
the Germans will experience some growing pains as they assume a 
political and military orientation com mensurate with their economic 
power. As has been the case with the United States, Germany will 
sometimes falter in its leadership role. These instances should not be 
interpreted as attempts by Germany to break away from the W est 
and a return to its militaristic past. Rather, as this thesis seeks to 
dem onstrate, reunited Germany will pursue its new international 
role in much the same fashion as West Germany carved out a new
6international image for itself: through pragmatic, sensitive diplomacy 
and a acute awareness of its historical legacy.
In reunited Germany, with a population of 78 million, there are 
dramatic social and economic divisions between East and West. It is 
natural that, at times, German policy makers will be preoccupied 
with internal concerns wrought by unification. Again, this should not 
be construed as a German attempt to withdraw from its 
responsibilities in Europe and in the world. The historical 
consequences of domestic political unrest in Germany for the rest of 
Europe have been tragic; that German policy makers feel the need to 
pay particular attention to problems at home should be com forting to 
E u ro p ean s .
This thesis is divided into four chapters, each of which 
examines issues which dem onstrate the fundamental changes in 
Germany since the end of World War II, and particularly in the wake 
of the bipolar order. These changes have resulted in an atmosphere 
in which European integration proceeds through a com bination of 
two factors: diplomatic cultivation of the idea of European Union in 
the form of intergovernmental conferences, and the functional and 
political cooperation of trans-national groups and organizations 
which recognize the need for closer cooperation among mem ber 
states in today's interdependent global economy.
The first chapter seeks to provide a framework with which to 
analyze Germany's role in the emerging Europe. That chapter: 1) 
begins with the clarification of key conceptual elements of 
integration; 2) assesses the contributions of functionalism and 
neofunctionalism to the study of European integration; 3) exam ines
7the "new dynamism" of the EC which has witnessed a re-emergence 
of neofunctionalism as a viable approach to the study of integration; 
and finally, 4) assesses the current climate of European integration in 
light of recent significant developments in the internal and external 
environments of the EC. By establishing a framework that 
encompasses both traditional tenets of functionalism and the new 
realities of negotiations among Europeans for closer political and 
economic union, we can better understand that process as it evolves 
into more flexible and adaptable plans for European union.
The second chapter seeks to dem onstrate the decisive break 
with traditional German foreign policy by Konrad Adenauer in the 
late 1940's. Historically, German foreign policy since Bismarck was 
marked by aggressiveness and an inferiority com plex which derived 
from Germany's uncertain status among the continent's powers. Was 
it a continental power whose primary interests were in Eastern 
Europe? Or was it an aspiring colonial power, waiting in the wings to 
challenge Britain and France for their overseas empires?
The answers to these questions can perhaps be found in the 
establishment of the W est German state in the aftermath of the 
Second World War. In the early years of W est German statehood, 
Adenauer's firm com m itm ent to the W estern alliance and the United 
States enabled the Germans to establish a new political identity as 
democratic, free-market oriented members of the West. Although 
this has not solved the "German Question" entirely it has mitigated 
somewhat the traditional confusion among Germans as to what their 
national identity was.
8The third chapter examines the centrality of Germany to 
European integration. It charts the supportive W est German role in 
the EC and demonstrates that reunified Germany will continue to 
support integration. Through their support of European political 
cooperation and European monetary union, the Germans have 
demonstrated that they have a vested interest in further European 
integration. Protests that German recognition of Croatia and Slovenia 
dem onstrated that Germans were breaking out of the constraints 
of the EC were unfounded. Taking the diplomatic initiative, Germany 
was actually carefully stepping into its new shoes as a powerful 
regional leader.
In an elaboration of the theme of European political 
cooperation, chapter four examines the implications of German 
reunification on European security. While traditionally effective Cold 
War institutions such as NATO attempt to adapt to the new 
international environm ent by altering their missions, there is a 
genuine need for a new pan-European security system which 
accurately reflects the changes in Europe. While NATO may still have 
some utility, two particular opportunities present themselves to 
Europeans for new security arrangements. First, the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has a pan-European 
membership and w idespread support among that membership for an 
increased, institutionalized role. However, until this 
institutionalization occurs, the CSCE is likely to remain merely a 
consulta tive  body.
The Western European Union (WEU) also holds promise as an 
effective all-European force which can augm ent the defensive role of
9NATO by providing a peacekeeping force that can operate outside of 
NATO jurisdiction. Such a force would lend credibility to European 
efforts a speaking with a common voice in the areas of defense and 
security policy for Europe.
And finally, there is a brief conclusion which summarizes the 
findings of this thesis and contains remarks by the author on the 
future German role in Europe.
It is hoped that this study can serve a twofold purpose. The 
first is to dem onstrate that reunited Germany is a fundamentally 
more European country than those German states of the early 20th 
century; as such, it will be an ardent supporter of European 
integration and closer cooperation between both Eastern and 
Western European states. The second purpose is to attempt to shed
some light on the importance of regional integration. The European
experiment has been by far the most successful of its kind; if  we can 
apply knowledge gained to other unstable areas of the world, it may 
allow us to better understand the character of an emerging world
order in the wake of bipolarity.
A glossary has been provided at the end to help the reader sort 
through the myriad of acronyms and names present in any 
discussion of European integration.
Chanter  1: A Theoret ical  Framework
As in other social science endeavors, the study of Europe's 
integration efforts entails an understanding o f  key conceptual 
elements. The following section will discuss these conceptual 
definitions and a ttem pt to eliminate ambiguity where concepts tend 
to overlap and converge.
Such conceptual ambiguity is evident in the very notion of 
what constitutes "Europe." "Europe" can mean many different things. 
Do we adopt a geographical-historical or a linguistic-cultural 
definition of Europe? The problem is not confined to academia. 
Mikhail Gorbachev envisioned a Europe that stretches from "the 
Atlantic to the Urals."2 During her tenure as British Prime Minister, 
M argaret Thatcher repeatedly espoused a vision of Europe as a vast 
free trade area of Western European countries. U.S. Secretary of State 
James Baker has consistently reiterated that any conception of 
Europe which does not include the U.S. and NATO is unacceptable.
And to Jacques Delors, the EC Commission President, Europe means 
the institutions of the EC, developing inexorably toward a federal 
organization of nation-states.
2 Henry Trofimenko, "The Great Pan-European Dream: How Soon to a United  
Europe?" H a rv a rd  In terna tiona l R e v ie w , vol. xiv, no. 1, Fall 1991, p. 20.
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I n te g r a t io n .  I n te r d e p e n d e n c e ,  and I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l i s m :
A C onceptua l  U nd er s tan d in g
Integration has traditionally been treated as either a c o n d i t i o n  
or a p r o c e s s .  Functionalist and neofunctionalist writers such as David 
Mitrany and Ernst Haas focus on the processes by which political 
communities become integrated. To Haas, the process of integration 
was characterized by the transferring of political allegiances form 
one center to another. Integration was characterized by a process in 
which "political actors in several distinct national settings are 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities 
toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand 
jurisd ic tion  over the preexisting nation-states."3
Leon Lindberg also defines integration as a process in which 
actors shift their loyalties and expectations. In addition, he notes 
that "nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key 
domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to 
make jo int decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to 
new central organs."4 Such central organs are developed both to 
represent common interests of the political actors and to arbitrate 
conflicts of interest between them.
Other writers attempt to examine processes that lead to the 
condition of integration. Karl Deutsch defines integration as "the 
attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community ' and of
3 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting o f  Europe. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1958, p. 16.
4 Leon N. Lindberg, The P o li t ica l  Dynam ics o f  European Econom ic Integration.  
Stanford: Stanford U niversity Press, 1963, p. 6.
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institutions and practices strong enough and w idespread enough to 
assure...dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its 
p o p u la t io n ." 5 Amitai Etzioni sees integration as a condition which 
results from the unification process. The level and scope of 
integration is determined by the forces of unification such as control 
over the use of the means of violence, a recognized effective center 
of decision-making that can effectively oversee resource distribution, 
and a center which is the "dominant focus of political identification 
for the large majority of politically aware citizens."6
Funct ional and Neofunct ional  A p p roa c h es
to the Study o f  Integration:
A Framework for the Analys is  of  European Integrat ion
In the wake of the Second World War, the political and 
economic climate of Europe was in flux. The debilitating brush with 
fascism had cast a dark cloud over the nation-state system and 
nationalist tendencies. With a decimated population and crippled 
economic infrastructure, Europe was presented with a historically 
unique opportunity to begin anew. Amid the d isillusionm ent with 
the nation-state system, European leaders recognized the 
opportunity at hand to fundamentally reorder the relations of 
European countries. Entering the void created by the demise of
5 Karl W. Deutsch, et. al., P oli t ica l  Community in the North A tlan tic  Area.  
Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press, 1957, p. 5.
6 Amitai Etzioni, P o li t ica l  Unification .  New York: Holt, Rinehart and W inston, 
1965, p. 4.
1 3
nationalism were leaders committed to a functional approach to 
in te g ra t io n .
Functionalism as an approach to political integration was first 
articulated by David Mitrany in the 1930s.7 While there is great 
diversity in functionalist literature, there are certain basic tenets 
which distinguish it from traditional approaches to international 
relations. Traditional approaches to international relations were 
hampered by a rigid overemphasis on the nation-state system as a 
political unit capable of fulfilling social, economic, and technical 
needs of its citizens. According to the traditional approach to 
international politics, non-state actors such as functional 
organizations lack the ability to guarantee the most im portant need 
of citizens: territorial integrity, or protection from other states. Thus, 
power centered in the state is the true determinant o f  a state’s 
ability to provide for its citizens.
The primary distinction between the traditional and functional 
approaches is found in functionalism 's questioning of the invincibility 
of the nation-state system. Functionalism recognizes a more complex 
world consisting of numerous actors which are not derived from 
nation-states themselves. These actors are international or 
transnational organizations which are created to fulfill needs without 
regard to national boundaries, yet nevertheless operate w i t h in  a 
nation-state global system. The institutions of the EC, for example, 
create a supranational form of functional organization which provide
7 David Mitrany, The P rogress  o f  In ternational G overnm ent.  N ew  Haven: Y ale  
University Press, 1933. See also A Working Peace System.  C hicago: Quadrangle 
Press, 1966.
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specific technical or economic functions that the nation-state system, 
with its emphasis on power vested in the state, neglects.
Thus, functionalist doctrine constitutes a frontal assault on 
traditional, nation-state-based pow er politics in two prim ary areas. 
First, it suggests that the nation-state is not able to fulfill all of its 
citizen's needs. Second, functionalism criticizes the nation-state for 
its preoccupation with issues of territorial integrity and military 
security; the dominance of these issues at the national level comes at 
the expense of public welfare and the satisfaction of other needs of 
citizens. Functionalist doctrine further suggests that the nation-state 
is inadequate to keep pace with changing global economic, 
technological, and social forces. Instead, it promotes a proliferating 
regim e of cooperation in non-controversial areas—traditionally  the 
domain of "low politics"—by taking "small, incremental steps in areas 
where national sovereignty was not seriously threatened."8 
Ultimately, functional organization of global relations would go a long 
way toward not only providing for public welfare, but in developing 
a "working peace system" in which the bellicose tendencies of nation­
states are mitigated by the extent of their integration and integration 
with other political units.
Functional structures are determined by the needs they are 
designed to satisfy. Mitrany has noted that, "functional 
dimensions...determine themselves. In a like manner the function 
determines its appropriate organs. It also reveals through practice
8 Stephen George, Polit ics  and Policy in the European Community.  Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991, p. 6.
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the nature of the action required under the given conditions, and in 
that way the powers needed by the respective authority ."9
Central to functional theory is the doctrine of "ramification." 
Ramification suggests that increased cooperation in economic, 
technical, and developmental sectors will lead to a corollary increase 
in political cooperation. As ramification accelerates into other 
sectors, what will ideally emerge "is a complex interwoven network 
of cross-national organizations performing all the traditional... 
functions of the nation-state while at the same time rendering war 
im p o ss ib le ." 10
There are a number of shortcomings with functionalist doctrine 
that render it a rather deterministic approach. Functionalists, in 
their attempts to demonstrate the necessity of changing political 
structures to keep pace with economic and technical changes, seem to 
waver between a belief in an unstoppable "technical self- 
determination" and the need to change attitudes and attain a new 
political will. The functionalist's assumption of a global network of 
functional organizations seems to bury the nation state prematurely. 
As long as welfare is perceived as a national problem, it could be 
treated as such.
An additional suspect assumption of functionalist thinking is 
that in an era of increasing interdependence, governments make 
rational choices to delegate authority to newly arisen functional 
structures. If national leaders perceive that they are merely
9 Charles Pentland, In terna tiona l Theory an d  E uropean  In tegration .  N ew  York: 
The Free Press, 1973, p. 78.
10 Ibid., p. 69.
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delegating authority and not surrendering sovereignty, the functional 
organization is likely to be successful; but here functionalists are 
guilty of bestowing the nation-state with contradictory qualities.
They seem to suggest that the normally bellicose and self- 
aggrandizing nation-state will acknowledge the benefits of a 
functional organization—and thereby ra t iona l i z e  its ex istence.11
Thus, functionalist assumptions about the integration process 
suffer from questionable assumptions regarding the nature of the 
world system and the role of the nation-state in it. Among other 
mistaken assumptions about functionalism: 1) that jea lousies  of 
sovereignty are to be found only in territorial units, and not in 
functional ones, and that therefore the coordination of proliferating 
and overlapping agencies will not be as difficult as the conciliation of 
states; 2) that men are able to recognize, design, and agree upon the 
appropriate structures for each functional need, so that form follows 
as closely as possible the exigencies of the functionalist doctrine, 
placing unreasonable demands on human reason; and 3) the 
optimistic assumption that organizations designed for a specific need 
or problem will disappear as the need is met. This ignores the 
tendency for bureaucratic longevity and paroch ia lism .12
Neofunctionalism , as the intellectual successor of functionalism, 
recognized the extent to which cooperation in technical and 
ostensibly non-controversial fields gradually "spills" over into non­
technical or political areas. Functionalism naively neglected the 
phenomenon of power; neofunctionalists, such as Ernst Haas, noted
11 Ibid., p. 82-83.
12 Ibid., p. 71.
that integration was most likely to occur not to satisfy needs as the 
functionalists believed, but when parties with vested interests in the 
integrative act perceived gains from its successful conclusion. "Elites 
having expectations of gain from activity within a supranational 
organizational framework are likely to seek out like-minded elites 
across national f ron tie rs ."13
Thus, where functionalists saw integrative activity arising from 
mutual needs, neofunctionalists cited elite expectation of gain as the 
driving force behind integration. Functionalists saw the end of 
functional organization as the fulfillment of welfare needs and the 
eventual institutionalization of a world peace that could not be 
broken because it would not be feasible or desirable to threaten the 
interdependent relations. Neofunctionalism, on the other hand, seeks 
as an end functional federalism--the establishm ent of supranational 
bodies of authority which enjoy the same authoritative allocation 
pow er o f  nation-states.
Yet another critical distinction between the two approaches is 
found in Mitrany's doctrine of ramification and Haas' concept of spill­
over. Where ramification leads to technical cooperation in multiple 
sectors, spill-over suggests that integration will be determined by 
elite perceptions of success. "If actors, on the basis of their interest- 
inspired perceptions, desire to adapt integrative lessons learned in 
one context to a new situation, the lesson will be generalized."14 
Thus, where Mitrany and the functionalists see integration resulting
13 James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., C ontending  theories  o f  
In terna tiona l R ela tions.  3d Edition. New York: Harper and Row, 1990, p. 438.
14 Ernst B. Haas, B eyon d  the Nation-State .  Stanford: Stanford U niversity Press,
1964, p. 48.
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from the pressure of functional needs, Haas and the neofunctionalists 
see political integration occurring "through the interaction of political 
fo rces—interest groups, parties, governm ents, in ternational agencies- 
-which seek to exploit these pressures in pursuit of their own 
in te r e s ts ." 15
N eofunctionalists perceive that the outcom e of integration 
would be a "convergence of interests on the part of significant 
economic groups which derived, in turn, from a broader political 
consensus on m acroeconomic goals ."16 The neofunctionalists invested 
step by step economic integration with political ramifications, 
envisioning a transfer of political allegiances to a new center in 
Brussels. Where functional federalists like Jean Monnet, Paul Henri 
Spaak, and Hallstein ultimately envisioned a federal structure 
emerging from functional areas of cooperation, neofunctionalists tend 
to envision a supranational political form. Thus, Haas suggests that 
European integration can be seen as a process in which "the end 
result of a process of political integration is a new political 
community, superim posed over the preexisting on es ."17
In elaborating on the neofunctionalism of Haas and others, 
Joseph Nye examines the "integrative potential" of actors. He 
establishes four conditions which determine the extent to which the 
integration process is successful: 1) the relative economic equality of 
units being integrated; 2) commonality of elite values; 3) pluralistic 
decision-making; and 4) adaptation and response capacity of units
16 Pentland, op. cit., p. 100.
16 Helen W allace, W illiam W allace, and Carole Web, eds., Policy  Making in the  
European Com munity .  2d ed. New York: W iley, 1983, p. 7.
17 Haas, (1958), op. cit., p. 18.
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being in teg ra ted .18 Seven "process mechanisms" are said to enhance 
the requisite conditions for the integration process: 1) spill-over, 
which can be positive or negative; 2) an increasing number of 
transactions, including trade, com munications, and human migration; 
3) the creation of coalitions and the grouping together of issues not 
based on technological necessity, but political feasibility; 4) elite 
socialization, in which national elites have a vested interest in the 
integration process; 5) development of regional groups in which 
general interests can be dealt with, leaving particular interests to be 
dealt with at the national level; 6) development and consolidation of 
a sense of identity which strengthens the community in the face of 
temporary setbacks; and 7) the impact of external actors on the 
in tegration p ro cess .19
Nye's reformulation of neofunctionalism noted that "process 
mechanisms" which determine integrative potential can also produce 
negative consequences. For example, the concept of spill-over 
assumed positive integration; that is, groups would favor integration 
in other sectors as it became apparent that the initial integrative act 
was successful. However, Nye raised the possibility of "spill-back," in 
which failed integration in one sector dampens enthusiasm for other 
in teg ra tive  a ttem pts .
Similar "negative" integration, or d is in tegra t ion ,  can occur in 
other "process mechanisms." Issue-linkage and political coalition 
building can backfire as political agendas of groups supporting 
integration change. The public perception of the benefits and success
18 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, op. cit., pp .444-445.
19 Ibid., pp. 443-445.
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of integration is closely tied to the political fortunes of groups 
associated with integration. Thus, if a group closely identified with 
integration falls out of favor with the public, it may damage the 
appeal of integration among the public.
As popular identification with integration increases, so too may 
opposition to integration. Segments of the population with 
nationalist sentiments may successfully dampen enthusiasm  if  there 
is a weak sense of ideological compatibility with the aims of 
integration. Thus, if the impetus of integration has widespread 
support, opponents will be less likely to attack it.
Finally, Nye notes the influence that external actors can have 
on the integration process. Previously, neofunctionalist doctrine 
viewed integration as an inexorable process occurring from within 
the community being unified. However, external state and non-state 
actors can act as catalysts or impediments of integration. The 
economies of the U.S. and Japan may provide incentive for 
developing economies of scale, for example, whereas the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization may impede integration by discouraging 
the establishment of a purely European defense force. The quality 
and scope of integration is determined by a wide range of factors, 
but integration is most likely to succeed if it is driven by internal 
forces and not external coercion.
Several examples illustrate this point. In the origins of the EC, 
the driving force behind the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) was the recognition by French and West German leaders in 
their mutual interests—for the' French a constructive security policy, 
for the West Germans a ticket to international acceptance. The EC’s
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experiment with increasing the scope and level of integration has 
progressed best when individual members recognize the mutual 
benefits of such integration. The passage of the Single European Act 
(SEA) in 1986 represented a dramatic victory for European 
f e d e ra l is ts .
Conversely, there are also numerous examples of federations 
whose cultural, economic, and political cohesion occurred through 
force or coercion. The most readily available examples are found in 
the plight of Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. In both cases, 
disintegration of political units occurred in the wake of the demise of 
a central authority's ability to use force to coerce.
Funct iona l .  Polit ical ,  and C ult ivated  Spil l -over
Haas and Lindberg both based their analyses on the early 
experiences of the European Coal and Steel Community and the 
European Communities in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Drawing 
on the early successes of these integration attempts, their initial 
assessment of spill-over was that it would automatically lead to 
integration in other sectors. However, by the late 1960s optimism 
about the future of the EC waned as De Gaulle demonstrated that 
national concerns could effectively block efforts of the Community to 
increase the scope and level of integration. The spill-over of 
cooperation and integration into other sectors was no longer 
automatic. It was probable, but conditional.
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Three dimensions to the spill-over process can be identified: 
functional, political, and cultivated, (or accentuated) spill-over.20 
Functional spill-over arises from the technical characteristics of 
integration. The technical nature of the integrating sector is tied into 
other functional areas which must eventually also undergo 
integration. The primary example of this is the ECSC. Through 
d i r ig i s m e  (state-dominated planning), the integration of coal and 
steel would naturally lead to the integration of other energy sectors. 
This spill-over would continue until the whole economy was 
in t e g r a te d .2 1
Political spill-over arises from the pluralist character of 
Western Europe. The spill-over process turns political as national 
elites achieve their own benefits from integration and are convinced 
to shift their expectations and loyalties to a new center. As it 
becomes clear that their interests will be best served by integration, 
elites are prompted to call for further integration. Thus, both at the 
governm ental and non-governm ental levels e lites  generate pressures 
for greater levels of integration.22
Finally, cultivated or accentuated spill-over results from the 
central institutions of integration. The common interests of 
com m unity  members are both represented and arbitrated in 
com m unity-level institutions. These institutions constantly  reassess 
and upgrade the common interests of members when it is politically
20 George, op. cit., p. 22.
21 Jeppe Tranholm -M ikkelsen, "Neofunctionalism : O bstinate or O bsolete? A 
Reappraisal in the Light o f  the New Dynamism o f  the EC," M il le n iu m ,  vol. 20, 
no. 1, Spring 1991, p. 5.
22 Ibid., p. 6.
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desirable and feasible to do so.23 Thus, where functional and political 
spill-over are seen as probable, if not absolute, processes that are 
determined by the level of technical integration or the perception of 
gain, cultivated spill-over directly results from an effort to upgrade 
the com mon interest.
It is in this sense that spill-over is most useful as an analytic 
tool in examining Germany's role in the emerging European order. 
Functional and political spill-over have encouraged integration in 
some EC policy realm s—agriculture, monetary, and social po lic ies— 
but have thus far been ineffective in areas where national m embers 
are not yet willing to share decision-m aking authority—namely, 
defense and foreign policy. However, it is in cultivated spill-over— 
the developm ent o f  pragmatic political stra teg ies—that the promise 
for a united Europe lies in the future.
The integrative process in Europe has evolved into a pragmatic, 
consensual decision-making apparatus. Rather than envisioning 
integration as an idealistic and inexorable process, today's European 
federalists are willing to compromise and to subordinate larger 
federal dreams to an incremental strengthening of the scope and 
level of integration.
The intergovernm ental conferences on monetary union and 
political cooperation held in the Dutch city of Maastricht in December 
1991 dem onstrate  the willingness to com prom ise among proponents 
of a federal Europe. Concessions, such as those offered to Great 
Britain to "opt out" of joining a single currency and the deletion from
23 Ibid., p. 6.
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the treaty text of the European Union's ultimate federal goal, allowed 
European federalists to pass through a w atered-down version. In 
essence, there was something for every party to the treaty.
Thus, Germany will play a central role in Europe through a 
combination of newly won assertiveness in foreign policy and 
through adroit d ip lom atic  m aneuvering--or cu ltivated spill-over.
The combination of functional and political spill-over allows 
integrative schemes in some realms to succeed; but without 
cultivating spill-over, the drive to a more federal Europe would stall 
in the technical policy-making sectors.
This is particularly important when one notes the relative 
demise of security-related issues in the international arena and the 
increasing im portance o f  economic interdependence. Increased 
economic interdependence between the EC and Eastern Europe will 
enhance efforts to expand integration. G erm any’s role in this 
emerging order will be characterized by twin efforts at seizing the 
initiative in the East and solidifying its relationships within the West. 
As one com m entator has cogently suggested:
-  ►
as econom ic and diplom atic issues becom e entangled, a com mon  
European identity, and desire for a more coherent foreign p olicy , 
based both on m ultip le bargains among m em bers and em pathy for 
one another's positions, may emerge. And, in the case o f  relations 
with Eastern Europe, a com m on W est European policy may w ell be 
a way for Bonn to obtain broader legitim acy for its O s t p o l i t i k  and 
for Bonn's partners to try to exert som e control over it.^4
24 H offm an, Stanley, and Robert Keohane, “Com m unity Institutional C hange,” 
in The Dynamics o f  European Integration,  ed. by W illiam  W allace, New York: 
Pinter Publishers, 1990.
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We can discern several shared qualities among integration 
theorists examined here. First, there is a recognition that integration 
is a process in which political loyalties and expectations are shifted 
from one center to another. Second, internal elites are driving forces 
behind the integration process, due to the expectations of jo in t 
rewards. Third, functionalists recognize the centrality of collective 
decision-making and pluralism. And finally, spill-over is recognized 
as probable and not automatic.
The functional and neofunctional approaches to the study of 
international integration can thus be divided into two separate, 
although not mutually exclusive, orientations. First, there is the 
"mutual needs" orientation in which integration is said to arise to 
fulfill a specific technical, economic, or social need. These welfare 
needs, traditionally considered the domain of "low" politics, are 
underrepresented by the nation-state , which is overly  concerned 
with "high" politics such as military and security issues.
Consequently, the international system is one of d iscordance and 
conflict. With the elevation of "mutual needs" issues, the 
international system can be transformed into a global com munity 
characterized by cooperation and absence of war.
The other dominant orientation to international integration 
is categorized as "mutual benefit" or "perception of gain". In 
contrast to the mutual needs orientation, this approach emphasizes
motivation over necessity. Integration will be determined by the 
benefits derived from the integrative act and w hether those benefits
gained are worth the costs of supporting and pursuing integration.
Thus, it is likely that integration will not arise to fulfill a welfare
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function but rather as a result of the competition between elites and 
groups that have a stake in the integrative act.
In light of institutional developments within the EC and the
dramatic alteration of the external environm ent, neofunctional 
theory, once considered obsolete by its main apologist,25 has a 
newfound relevance. Since 1985 and the decision to proceed with
the consolidation of the single market, the concept of spill-over has
re-emerged as a useful analytic concept. The designation of three 
specific methods by which spill-over can take place—functionally, 
politically, and through upgrading the com mon in terest—has lent 
neofunctionalism  new relevance that was evident in the formative 
years of the EC.26
There remain serious limitations to neofunctionalism. The 
primary critics of neofunctionalism can be divided into two groups: 
in te rgovernm en ta lis ts  and in te rdependence  theorists . 
I n t e r g o v e r n m e n ta l i s t s  suggest that the nation-state is more 
adaptable and able to thrive in the geopolitical environment. While 
neofunctionalis ts  envision the developm ent o f  supranational 
institutions, in tergovernm entalists  stress the prim acy of national 
interests. As long as there are national interests and an external 
environm ent based on the competition o f  nation states, neofunctional 
integration would continue to dwell on less critical issues in 
international re la tions—such as econom ic and developm ental
25 Ernst B. Haas, The O bsolescence o f  R eg ion a l In tegration  Theory.  (Research  
Series, No. 25 , Institute for International Studies, U niversity o f  C alifornia, 
Berkeley, CA., 1975.
2  ^ M ikkelsen, op. cit., p. 16.
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c o n c e r n s .27 Thus, intergovernmentalists advocate that international 
cooperation be achieved through the diplomacy of states. Any 
cooperative agreements or structures that would arise would be 
subjugated to state control for state purposes. This differs 
dramatically  from the neofunctionalists who envision international 
organizations which would someday supplant the state's authority.
Interdependence theorists, on the other hand, share an 
intellectual affinity with neofunctionalists. Both downplay the role of 
national boundaries, believing that networks of interaction transcend 
borders at various levels in a multitude of sectors. However, as 
noted earlier,
"interdependence theory ...does not n ecessar ily  im ply integration  and, 
where integration occurs, interdependence theorists do not profess  
predilections for any particular outcom e. Integration is a condition , not 
a process, and the p ossib le integrative consequences o f  inter­
dependence are based on political acts that are not predicted by the 
theory." 2 8
Thus, integration can be seen as a form of institutionalized 
interdependency, an attempt to increase cooperation and exchanges 
of information, goods, and services across national boundaries. In 
doing so, integration theorists suggest that the increased 
interdependence that arises from increased scope and levels of 
integration will provide a system in which conflict can be managed.
27 Ibid., p. 10.
28 Ibid., p. 9.
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The Context  of  German Reunification
The purpose of this thesis is to examine united Germany's role 
in post-Cold War Europe. The Federal Republic was created in the 
early post-war era to serve as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism 
and to fundamentally change the character of German statehood.
Both purposes were effectively fulfilled as witnessed by the Federal 
Republic's absorption of East Germany in 1990.
The demise of the bipolar world order has created a fluid and 
uncertain political atmosphere in Europe. German unification was a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for its new-found power.
The relative decline of the U.S., the collapse of Soviet Communism, 
the "economic miracle" of the Federal Republic, the success of 
W estern integration, and the appeal of the Western standard of 
living to Eastern Europeans have all been important factors in 
G erm any's newfound status.
European and international concerns about the foreign policy 
intentions of an unfettered Germany are significant. Such concerns 
are born from the historical image of Germany as an imperial power 
bent on European conquest. Traditionally considered a truly "Central 
European" power, trusted by neither West nor East, Germany has 
spent most of the 20th century as the defining divisive force in 
Europe. However, the character of German statehood has 
metamorphosed from its autocratic and militaristic origins into a 
representative dem ocracy with constitutional constrain ts on its use 
of military power.
Thus, the unification of Germany must be seen in its proper 
context. Germany possesses none of the hegemonic designs of its 
predecessors, largely due to the fact that it is woven so tightly into 
the military and economic fabric of the West. This has been made 
possible by a number of factors, not least significant of which is its 
domestic political resocialization. Other indications of Germany's 
transformation include its abandonm ent of any claims to former 
German territory, and its pledge not to produce or control any 
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and to limit its armed forces 
to 370,000. Finally, it is unprecedented that German unification has 
taken place with the acceptance of Germany's neighbors.
In the emerging European order, Germany's interests will not 
drift eastward, resulting in a new Rapallo.* Rather, as one 
com mentator has noted, "new questions the united Germany has to 
face—reordering of security structures, aiding Eastern Europe, 
expanding scope and level of in tegration—are inseparable from those 
of the wider Europe. The fact that Germany will take the initiative 
more often than it did in the past should not be misunderstood as 
replaying the old and unsettling national game of Germany as the 
central but 'outsider' nation."29 German actions in the international 
arena will likely adhere to principles so carefully developed in the 
post-w ar era: multilateralism, a continued emphasis on m aintaining
* A reference to the Treaty o f  Rapallo in 1922 when the pariah states o f  Europe, 
Germany and the new ly consolidated Soviet Union, signed a friendship  
agreem ent. The word connotes the suspicion o f  Europeans that the Germans 
will turn East at the expense o f  their Western alliances.
29 Arnold, op. cit., pp. 464-465.
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some form of the Atlantic alliance, and the continued support for 
European integration through the EC.
This thesis argues that the character of the "new European 
order" will to a great extent depend on Germany's ability to clarify 
and define its new international role. This is a significant task for 
Germany in the sense that its international position has always been 
explicit, imposed on the country from greater external powers.
Critical to Germany's success in securing a constructive role is the 
recognition of the dramatically  altered international environm ent, 
both on behalf of Germany and on behalf of its allies. As it strives to 
establish itself in the new European environment, Germans must 
succeed in a difficult balancing act, pacifying fears while at the same 
time leading constructive change.
That German unification has forced a reexamination of that 
country's international role is obvious. However, the unexpected 
events surrounding the unification process also call for a 
reexamination of the EC's role. In the West, integration efforts of 
recent years have been instructive as to how to expand cooperation 
and integration toward the liberalizing countries of Eastern Europe.
As the debate on how best to manage change in Europe progresses, a 
conception of European unity which encom passes interdependence, 
intergovernmentalism , and integration theory is useful. The 
diversity of countries which desire to become part of "Europe" is 
great; they range from traditionally neutral members of the 
European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA), such as Austria and Norway, 
to former W arsaw Pact members such as Czechoslovakia and Poland. 
For this reason, any conception of "European unity" must include any
non-integrative relationships which nevertheless contribute  to a 
more cooperative and peaceful relationship.
Thus, Germany will play a central role in expanding the level 
and scope of European integration. The central institutions of Europe 
(NATO, EC, and the Helsinki process) of which Germany has been and 
will remain a pivotal member, must adapt their roles to a changing 
international context. Some of these institutions already include 
most European countries, others still have memberships which 
reflect their Cold War origins. Increased economic interdependence 
that has resulted from the fall of the Iron Curtain will inevitably 
result in greater economic integration. The key issue at stake is the 
ability of European nations (with Germany assuming a more active 
role) to cultivate conditions which will lead to a greater scope and 
level of European integration.
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C h a p te r  2; T h e  Role o f  Id e n t i ty  an d  C u l tu re  in 
G e rm a n  F o re ig n  Policy
Since B ism arck’s Reich, German history has been dominated by an 
awkward and often debilitating search for an equal position among the 
world’s major powers. The journey has been awkward in the sense that 
Germany’s neighbors have often viewed it as a parvenu power with 
sinister motives; it has had a debilitating effect when international and 
domestic circumstances have conspired to destroy the German nation­
state. Thus, the focal point of German and European history since Bismarck 
has been the solution to what is commonly referred to as the “German 
Question.” How can an inevitably powerful united Germany be 
incorporated into the family of nations without threatening her neighbors?
The extent of the “ German Problem” is influenced considerably by its 
geography. Located in the heart of Central Europe, the Land in der Mitte 
(land in the middle) has historically had to cast a watchful eye to both the 
West and the East for potential allies and foes. Bismarck himself 
undertook diplom atic maneuvering to prevent dreaded encirc lem ent in 
which G erm any’s neighbors joined together in an alliance to prevent the 
Reich from becoming a dominant power. Without overseas colonial 
possessions and heavily dependent on exports, G erm any’s rapid rise to 
continental dominance was perceived by existing major powers as a direct 
threat to their status and wealth.
The temporary answer to this question was found in the catharsis of 
World W ar II and in the separation of Germany into Western and Eastern 
spheres of influence. This exacerbated the already difficult search for a 
German identity, creating two states out of one people linguistically and, to
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a lesser extent, culturally linked. The existence of two German states 
which offered diametrically opposed social and economic systems 
prompted vigorous public and academic debate on whether it was possible 
to unify Germany and still maintain the security of her neighbors.
The following section traces the role of G erm any’s search for national 
identity from Bismarck’s Reich to the fall of the Third Reich in 1945. It 
also examines the political culture of the Federal Republic and the 
diminished emphasis on nationality among the younger generation at the 
expense of support for European integration.
Identity and Polit ical  Culture  in Pre-W ar Germany
Compared to other nation-states of Western Europe, German unity 
arrived late and uncertainly. German territory had historically served as 
E urope’s battleground, devastated by campaigns such as the Hundred 
Years W ar and N apoleon’s attempt at empire-building. While other nation­
states of Europe were establishing overseas colonial em pires and wielded 
vast economic and military capabilities, “G erm any” remained fractured into 
hundreds of minor principalities. As economic modernization and political 
development proceeded in countries such as Britain and France the 
splintered area constituting Germany remained preoccupied with feudal 
econom ic structures and religious divisiveness.
In 1871, under the weight of Prussian militarism and Bismarck’s 
adroit leadership, hundreds of principalities were united into the Second 
German Reich. Germany at that time was in the midst of a period of rapid 
industrialization which created a burgeoning middle class. Unlike the 
middle classes in Britain and France, however, the German middle class did
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not experience an increase in political power commensurate with economic 
m o d e rn iz a t io n .
Despite its rapidly industrializing economy, G erm any’s international 
status was largely due to the might of the Prussian military. Compared to 
countries and kingdoms in the East and Southeast, the German Reich was 
indeed a dominant power. However, the perpetual coalition-building and 
balance-of-power system of the W est effectively checked the R eich’s 
ambitions of world-pow er status.
Because German unification occurred by virtue of force rather than 
by internal integration of principalities, Germans suffered from an identity 
crisis. As unification was an artificial imposition on the Germans, they 
never developed a strong identification with the German nation-state the 
way the British and French had. This lack of identity contributed to a 
pessimistic sense of underachievement and failure among Germans 
relative to their French and British counterparts.
There have been a number of scholarly attempts to study the causes 
of the German “ identity crisis.” Harold James has noted that the 
development of a national identity must be preceded by the existence of 
institutional identity. W ithout institutional arrangem ents around which 
people can form a common identity, a national identity is not possible.
In establish ing their vision o f  a nation in the century before 1871 
Germans could not look to the present to establish what German identity 
meant. Their territory was politically  fragmented, and m ost o f  its units 
were h ighly in effective in international p o litics. Often when the present 
looks threatening and hostile, we look back to the com fort o f  heroic stories 
from the past. In com m on with other ’new nations’ o f  the nineteenth  
century—Italians, Hungarians, C zechs, South S la v s—Germ ans cou ld  find  
no justification  for national ex isten ce in any ex isting set o f  in stitu tion s.1
1 Harold James, A G erm an Identity, 1770-1990 .  London: W eidenfeld and N ico lson , 
1990, p. 8.
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Institutional identity in Britain and France—in the form of 
constitutional arrangem ents of authority between executives and 
legislatures—enabled their citizens to forge an idea of what it meant to be 
British or French. Political and institutional arrangements provide a focal 
point of identity and national purpose which “generate a sense of 
legitimacy in themselves and in the community of which they are part, and 
which they come to represent. In the end they create patterns of behavior 
which can be eventually identified as national properties.”2
Germany could look towards the feudal East and feel superiority in 
military and bureaucratic organization. However, Germany lacked a 
political foundation for its nationalism that other major nation-states had. 
Germans observed the consolidation of British and French overseas 
empires and “acknowledged the historical superiority and the eventual 
inevitability of the nation-state. Some of them deduced that they should 
imitate this form of political organization if they were not to be defeated 
and subjected to the rule of other nations. The nation-state became not 
simply a blueprint for desirable development, but a necessary form ula for 
political survival.”3
It is clear that nineteenth-century Germany was no more guilty of 
self-aggrandizem ent than Britain or France, nation-states which vigorously 
pursued overseas empires through military subjugation of indigenous 
peoples. However, Germany's central geographical position on the 
continent prompted the British and the French to cast a wary eye towards 
any of her foreign policies. Added to this was the fact that Germans
2 Ibid.. p. 9.
3 Ibid., p. 11.
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suffered from a political identity crisis. Was Germany merely a regional 
power or a country destined to compete globally with other major powers? 
Due in large part to the military emphasis on nationalism, its inferiority 
complex toward the West, and its arrogance toward the East, the Germans 
developed a blustery diplomatic assertiveness which would define their 
image in Europe until 1945. As two political scientists have noted:
Throughout much o f  her history, Germany has been a country without 
equals. One or more o f  her Western neighbors have usually appeared to 
her as wealthier, more powerful, and more h ighly respected in the world.
Her eastern neighbors, on the other hand, the P oles, the C zechs, Hungarians, 
Russians, and Baltic peoples, have usually been looked down upon by 
Germ ans as in ferior--in  w ealth , techn ology , c iv iliza tio n , or m ilitary pow er.4
Domestically, G erm any’s rapid industrialization occurred w ithout the 
attendant liberalization of political institutions. Atavistic elites such as the 
agrarian Junkers remained powerful. Prussian military elites and newly 
em erging industrial interests combined to dom inate  the structures and 
purposes of the political process. Thus, in contrast to Britain and France, 
whose polities were undergoing change com m ensurate  with economic 
modernization, German political culture lagged behind its rapid 
industrialization. The result in Germany was
an authoritarian structure that was based on a constitutional theory 
that sp ecifica lly  repudiated the idea o f  popular sovereignty , and, in its 
brief and pow er-obsessed  career, it denied to its citizen s any opportunity  
to grow in se lf-re lian ce  and political resp on sib ility .5
The Bismarckian Reich experienced success in developing its 
industrial base and ascending to continental major pow er status. Germans
4 Karl Deutsch and L ew is Edinger, quoted in Dirk Verheyen, The G erm an Question.  
Boulder, CO.: W estview Press, 1991, p. 100.
5 Gordon Craig, The Germans.  New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1982, p. 290.
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increasingly believed they were destined to fulfill a global role as the 
British and French had. That this caused enormous apprehension in its 
neighbors was of little concern to Germans; they perceived their rapid 
ascendancy as the logical progression of German history in which Germany 
assumed its equal (or, at times, superior) position among the powers. The 
British and French saw Germany as a parvenu aggressor who challenged 
the traditional balance of power on the continent. To Germans, “preserving 
the European balance, while extra-European giants formed all around, 
meant condemning Germany to mediocrity and, ultimately, all of Europe to 
external domination. That was the German Problem as the Germans saw 
i t .”6 In short, the issue was less a matter of G erm any’s aggressiveness than 
it was the fact that G erm any’s rise in stature “ threatened the political 
independence and economic well-being of its neighbors.”7
Bism arck’s Reich was successful in elbowing its way into the group of 
major powers without shattering the balance of power largely because of 
the skill of Chancellor Bismarck. His prestige and political acumen allowed 
him to dominate domestic politics, mitigating the radical positions of the 
military. However, after his demise in 1890 the latent contradictions of 
the system began to manifest themselves. Without the diplomatic 
foresight o f  Bismarck, the German system was eventually bound to 
confront the incongruities of the social and political order.
As long as traditional elites dominated domestic politics and pursued 
aggressive foreign policies, such incongruities remained insignificant.
Irresponsible and reckless foreign policies could be pursued to promote
6 David Calleo, The German P rob lem  Reconsidered.  Cambridge: Cambridge U niversity  
Press, 1978, p. 5.
7 Ibid., p. 1.
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the interests of the dominant groups without subjecting them to the 
scrutiny of opposition groups. However, the failure to secure a decisive 
victory in World War I created domestic dissent which questioned the 
wisdom of the war. As David Conradt has noted,
W hile the political power o f  the m iddle classes in Britain and France grew  
and generally exerted a m oderating influence on p o licy , in the Prussian- 
dom inated Second Reich the old “ feudal” c la sses—nobility , m ilitary, large 
lan dow ners—m aintained and expanded their d om estic h egem on y  and 
pursued defense and foreign p o lic ies designed  to unify soc iety  and m ain­
tain their position  o f  pow er...T his faulted social and p olitica l order 
could not survive a lengthy war, and World War I exposed its fatal weak­
nesses. After the failure o f  the initial German offen sive  in the W est, 
designed to produce a quick victory, the prospect o f  a protracted 
con flic t began to make m anifest the latent tensions and contradictions  
in the social and political order o f  the Second R eich.8
The fractured chaos of the ensuing Weimar Republic complicated 
Germany’s historical sense of impotence in foreign affairs. The harsh 
armistice of the Treaty of Versailles humiliated Germans and planted seeds 
of resentm ent among conservatives who blamed the co u n try ’s deteriorated 
standing on the liberals and socialists who had forced the K aiser’s 
abdication. Contradictory forces competed for influence in a new 
government based on a liberal constitution which sought universal 
suffrage and parliamentary democracy. While the W eim ar Republic 
enjoyed a fleeting period of stabilization, a number of international and 
domestic factors combined to undermine its potential success.
One event in particular demonstrates the continuation of the German 
feeling of impotence in the international arena. In 1923, the French 
military occupied the Rhineland, the industrial heartland of Germany.
8 David Conradt, The German Polity,  New York: Longman, 1982, pp. 5-6.
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Acting in response to G erm any’s failure to maintain crippling war 
reparations, the French exacerbated an already volatile situation. 
Resentment of the French action grew rapidly among Germans. This 
resentment played into the hands of conservative political parties who 
continued to emphasize German militaristic nationalism. Despite the 
election of war hero Paul von Hindenburgh as president of the republic, 
conservatives were hesitant to fully support a regim e constituted by 
liberals. The inability of the government to defend the German heartland 
further d iscredited W eim ar among conservatives.
In 1929, the incremental developm ent of the W eim ar dem ocracy 
came to a grinding halt. The world economic depression initiated by the 
American stock market crash served as the final destabilizing event in 
W eim ar’s short history. As inflation and unem ployment soared, 
dem ocratically-m inded parties lost legitimacy to extrem ist com m unist and 
conservative nationalist parties. A fter steadily increasing their influence 
in parliament to the point where they were the strongest party, the Nazis 
succeeded in brokering from a conservative coalition the chancellorship for 
their leader, Adolf Hitler. By March of 1933, Hitler had succeeded in 
eliminating his opposition in parliament through the passage of the 
“Enabling Act,” which granted him dictatorial powers.9
Thus, the W eimar Republic was seriously hampered by internal 
discord which resulted in a lack of consensus on a uniform foreign policy. 
International events such as the French occupation of the Rhineland and 
the world economic depression were disabling factors in leaders’ attempts 
to consolidate W eimar democracy and establish Germany as a respected
9 Ibid., p. 8.
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member of the international community. This period was followed by a 
conservative retrenchm ent which drove G erm any’s international conduct 
back into familiar patterns of aggressive militarism.
Ironically, the polarization of domestic politics in the W eimar 
Republic was controlled to a certain extent by conditions imposed on the 
government from the international system. The single most effective 
unifying force in Weimar was the governm ent’s ability to blame “foreign” 
nations for problems. Economic policies were justifiable with a reference 
to reparations paym ents which drastically limited the governm ent’s 
available courses of action. However, the republic was responsible for the 
unenviable task of presiding over a rapidly changing society w ithout the 
ability to act independently and decisively. Dramatic and rapid social 
change outpaced the development of the political system:
W eim ar’s politicians lived in a world shaped by the hopes and expectations  
generated by the p olitical transformation o f  1918-19 , which had produced  
a powerful and costly  push for social reform: lim itation o f  the hours 
o f  work, the institution o f  wage contracts and o f  state arbitration o f  
labour conflicts. At the same time they lived in a world shaped by the 
A llie s ’ hopes and expectations o f  1918-19: in particular the French in sisten ce  
that the Germans should pay a major part o f  the costs o f  the war; and the 
American demand for the repayment o f  the inter-A llied  war debt. And 
finally, they were in a world whose real econom ic performance was so  weak  
that expectations were likely to be d isapp oin ted .10
In such an atmosphere, it was only a matter of time before democratically- 
minded parties lost support to extremist com m unist and right-wing parties 
that pandered to the fears of Germans. It was in this climate that the Nazis 
proved particularly adept at gaining support.
The virulent brand of nationalism practiced by Hitler and the Nazis
10 James, op. cit., p. 134.
clearly dem onstrated that the traditions of m ilitarism and authoritarianism  
were alive and well. The blustery, aggressive diplomacy conducted by the 
Third Reich also highlighted the traditional German inferiority complex 
vis-a-vis western powers such as Britain and France and the superiority 
complex toward less-developed countries in eastern Europe. One 
com m entator has suggested that this attitude perm eated G erm an y ’s 
foreign policy after 1871:
There does appear to have been an adolescent assertiveness accom panied  
by a preference for drama, a preference so deep and abiding as to be 
unaffected by the w eakness or strength o f  G erm any’s position in the 
world at any given moment. This proclivity for the abrasive touch may well 
grow out o f  a—largely if  not entirely unwarranted—concern over not being  
taken seriously enough by others, especially  as a new arrival on the 
in tern ational s c e n e .1 1
H itler’s “grand design” for Europe magnified the tensions that arose 
from a lack of German self-confidence. As Bismarck’s Prussia sought to 
establish the Second Reich and a universal “Germ an” identity from 
hundreds of fiefdoms, Hitler too attempted to create a German identity 
through annexation and G le ic h sc h a l tu n g .  Austria and former German 
territories to the East were swallowed up by the Nazi regime. Throughout 
the newly established Third Reich, the policy of G le ic h sc h a l tu n g  sought to 
harmonize all areas of life. Through propaganda and harmonization of 
social life, a new German race would be created which would expand 
eastward in search of l e b e n s r a u m ,  or living space.
It is clear that the experiment of W eimar democracy failed to 
consolidate the ambitious program of social and political change. The 
historical continuity of H itler’s foreign policy—annexation and the desire to
11 Verheyen, op. cit., p. 101.
42
establish a Greater German Reich—demonstrates this well. W hile the 
overwhelming Nazi preoccupation with race was a significant departure 
from G erm any’s conservative past, there remained similarities. M ost 
significant of these was the concern with “G erm any’s precarious position in 
the world of superstates.” 12 Encircled by potentially hostile nations on all 
sides, the historic German predicament was to seize a role internationally 
which would ensure that Germany would retain a prominent place among 
nations. Hitler, however, had grander designs of continental and world 
d o m in a t io n .
Thus, H itler’s solution to the “German Problem” was to aggrandize the 
German nation at the political, racial, and territorial expense of the rest of 
Europe. Such a policy orientation was unlikely to win allies in Europe; in 
this respect the Third R eich’s policies represent the traditional German 
penchant for arrogance and diplomatic bullying:
H itler’s vision for Europe, based on its exc lu sive  racist creed, offered little  
to other Europeans. If racially suitable, they m ight expect to becom e 
reconditioned Germans. O therwise, they would be exterm inated or enslaved.
It was an uncom prom ising program out o f  which to concoct an acceptable 
id eo lo g y —a decent drapery—to leg itim ize and soften  German d om in ation .1 2
The concept of a German identity—whether political, cultural, or
social—has proved elusive to German leaders and scholars of Germany.
Lacking the political institutions and liberal political culture of Britain and
France, Germans emphasized their linguistic affinity, their central
geographic position, and cultural nationalism. In an attempt to discover
their identity, Germans imitated successful nation-states:
12 Calieo, op. c il.. p. 85.
13 Ibid., p. 115.
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The com bination o f  uncertainty about where Germans lived , and o f  what— 
apart from a fictitious linguistic grou p -th cy  w ere, led to an unstable sense o f  
national identity. Germans learnt bourgeois manners from the French, 
p olitics from the Greeks, econom ics from the British, and consum erism  from  
the Am ericans. It is not surprising that the rich diversity o f  German 
borrowing produced som e very confused rea ctio n s.14
G erm any’s search for a national identity was different from the other 
Great Powers. Whereas Britain, France, and A merica represented examples 
of the modern “ western” nation-state, in which the state developed 
autonomously from a national movement, the Germans found themselves 
in 1871 the only country among the Great Powers whose polity had yet to 
fulfill its nationalistic desires and ambitions. As a consequence Germany 
was also the Great Power with the greatest problem of meeting the 
expectations and demands of its c itizenry .15
Identity and Culture in Post-War Germany;
N a t io n a l i s m  D is c r e d i t e d
From a political and social standpoint, the cathartic experience of the 
Third Reich was a watershed period in German history. Prior to 1945, a 
number of factors were evident which highlight the dilemmas of trying to 
define the idea of German identity. The question of “what Germany is and 
is not, the persistent mystique of the Reich, delayed national unification, 
and the illiberal nature of traditional German nationalism ,” remained, but 
were dram atically  altered by new circum stances.16
14 James, op. cit., p. 31.
15 Ibid., p. 33.
'6  Verheyen, op. cil., p. 65.
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The new Germany completely rejected the harsh brand of Nazi racial 
nationalism. A new Germany would eventually seek to reenter the world 
community, many of whose members suffered greatly from Nazi atrocities. 
The Nazi legacy was a liability which required a tremendous amount of 
diplomatic reconciliation and sensitivity to overcome. Thus, while 
nationalism did not entirely disappear, it was shaped by new forces.
Three particular aspects of the German identity problem  are evident 
since the end of World War II. The first aspect is that of historical 
consciousness. Because so much of German history is fraught with an 
illiberal and anti-Western approach to nationhood, the dem ocratic Federal 
Republic could not look to its past for a foundation.17 However, like other 
nations, the Federal Republic cannot divorce itself from its past. Thus, 
while 1945 can be seen as a watershed moment in German history, the 
events prior to 1945 cannot be divorced from the current German state.
Second, the establishment of a common German identity was unlikely 
to come about with the establishment of two states, each under the 
influence of diametrically-opposed ideological blocs. In the Federal 
Republic, a gradual identification with the institutions, values, and 
processes of democracy indicated a significant shift in public opinion since 
the 1950s.18 In the German Democratic Republic (GDR), forty years of 
com munist rule inevitably shaped political culture in a d ivergent path 
from its Western counterpart. Like the Federal Republic, the G D R ’s sense 
of identity reaches back into the German past, drawing on its Prussian 
heritage and nascent socialist movements present in Germany in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It also resembles the FRG in the
17 Ibid., p. 66.
18 Conradt, op. cit., p. 55.
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sense that its identity has been dramatically influenced by its b lo c ’s 
hegemonial power: hence the developm ent of an authoritarian socialist 
state on German soil.
C. Bradley Scharf has described the difficulty of ascribing any one 
factor as critical in the development of a separate identity in the GDR:
...it is tem pting to isolate a single attribute as the m ost essential defining  
elem ent. The GDR is a nation at a crossroads in a very profound sense. It 
is pulled in four directions sim ultaneously. It is intensely aware o f  its German 
past, w hile aspiring vigorously to a socia list future. It is a W est European 
nation because o f  its shared popular culture, and the highly v is ib le  presence  
o f  the Federal Republic as a point o f  interest and comparison. It is also  
an East European nation because o f  its m ilitary dependence on the Soviet
Union and its more or less com pulsory adoption o f  Soviet forms o f  political
organization  and public v a lu e s .19
Thus, the physical division of the German nation into two separate 
states resulted in the development of divergent identities, or national
orientations. The differences were only in kind. For each German state
served as the model, bulwark member of their respective alliances, and 
both drew substantially from the German past. However, both political 
cultures were not necessarily durable. This fact is highlighted by the 
gradual but certain adoption of Western values by the former East German 
popu lace .
The third significant factor in the development of a German identity 
after 1945 is found in its sensitivity to the international environment. The 
anxieties and uncertainties of the Federal Republic’s central position—a 
potential nuclear battleground—heighten the sense of insecurity. More 
than any other Western state, the Federal Republic served as a barometer 
of East-W est tensions and the progress of European integration.
19 C. Bradley Scharf, Politics and Change in East Germany. Boulder, CO.: W estview  
Press, 1984, p. 18.
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An early goal of European integration was to promote the acceptance of the 
new West German regime, thereby giving it a strong affinity with 
European identity. National sentiments remained, but after initial 
successes in integration and the consolidation of democratic institutions its 
effects were much less severe.20
The dramatic rise in nationalistic feelings among the German
populace in 1989-90 revived old concerns of the viability of the Federal 
R epublic’s democracy. Nationalist sentiment had survived in traditional 
regional affinities and the slow pace of social change suggested that 
nationalism was still a factor. To G erm any’s neighbors, the eruption of 
nationalism in Germany was reminiscent of a not-too-distant-past, a repeat 
of which they would avoid at all costs. Yet, two factors provide a 
compelling restraint on a return to Germany's past. First is the acute 
sensitivity of Germany's Nazi legacy; German leaders today understand
that they have a special responsibility in light of their country's past. The
second factor, a direct result of the first, is that Germany has pursued 
integration into the economic, military, and political fabric of the W est with 
unparalleled zeal. It is too early to say for certain whether the Federal 
Republic’s democratic political culture will predominate in a united 
Germany. However, with the total collapse of the GDR and the scope and 
level of the FR G ’s integration in the West, it would appear that this will be 
the case.
The following section examines the foreign policy orientations of the 
Federal Republic in the post-war era. The foreign policy patterns of the 
FRG developed in a corollary fashion to its democratic institutions. The
20 Verheyen, op. cit., p. 69.
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Federal Republic early on was a reactive power, its diplomatic ability 
severely hampered by the bipolar Cold W ar order and its burdensom e Nazi 
legacy. However, as the German populace slowly warmed to democratic 
values, processes, and institutions, so was the government able to 
incrementally gain more leeway in the conduct of its foreign policy. As 
both time and events continued to separate the FRG from the Nazi regime, 
the evolution of a new German diplomatic acumen and sensitivity became 
e v id e n t .
Foreign Policy in the FRG; Shifting Traditions .
Internat ional Acceptance ,  and the Drive For Unif icat ion
The story of the FR G ’s conduct of its foreign relations has been 
characterized by an incremental process o f  gaining international 
acceptance and gradually obtaining greater degrees of autonomy in foreign 
policy decision-making. Out of the ashes of the Third Reich, Germans had 
to reconstitute their political and social system. Sovereignty and 
nationalism were all but eradicated by occupying armies, narrowing the 
average German citizen’s concerns to providing for basic survival. Due to 
the savage and destructive twelve years of the Third Reich, there seemed 
to be universal agreement among the victors that G erm any’s punishment 
should be severe and lasting.
The erosion of the wartime alliance changed this. With the rise in 
East-W est tensions, the Cold War superimposed itself on any prior post­
war plans of occupation. In the West, the FRG was established in the mold 
of other liberal democratic societies. In the East, the GDR was established 
as a socialist German state under the dominance of the Soviet Union. Thus,
from an early moment in the post-war period, the FR G ’s foreign policy 
formation and im plem entation abilities were clearly constrained by Allied 
preferences and interests. The new German state was “an offspring of 
bipolarity, conceived and nurtured by the strategic imperatives of the 
West. Yet while the Federal Republic was bound to profit from the 
transformation of the dominant international conflict, it was also its 
prostrate captive and, by virtue of its partition, its starkest sym bol.”21
Several distinct phases of the foreign policy orientation of the FRG 
may be discerned. The chancellorship of Konrad Adenauer, from 1949 to 
1962, was characterized by a recognition that sovereignty and German 
unity could only be attained incrementally and through close cooperation 
within the W estern community. Characteristic of this period was the 
acknowledgement of G erm any’s relative impotence for policy initiation, 
despite its central position in the Western Alliance. During this time, the 
FRG, as stated in its Basic Law, refused to recognize the GDR as a separate 
German state.
The warming of relations between the FRG and the communist-bloc 
countries was characteristic of this period. The FRG gradually moved 
toward peaceful coexistence with European members of the Soviet bloc, 
opening trade missions in a number of Eastern European countries in the 
mid-1960s. This was Ostpo l i t ik  in its embryonic form.
The election of the Social Democratic Party's (SPD) Willy Brandt to 
the office of chancellor in 1969 signalled a deepening of O stpo l i t i k .  In this 
period, the FRG officially recognized the post-war status quo, made strides
21 Josef Joffe, “The Federal Republic o f  G erm any’s Foreign P o licy ,” in Roy M acridis, 
ed., Foreign P o licy  in World Politics. Englewood C liffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1985, p. 77.
to deepen inter-German detente, and succeeded in reducing Cold W ar 
tensions that had dominated bloc and inter-German affairs since 1949.
From 1974 to 1982, the SPD-led government of Helmut Schmidt 
presided over a dramatic rise in the F R G ’s international reputation. The 
economy grew rapidly and the FRG gradually seized more initiative in its 
conduct of foreign policy. Also, the 1970’s saw a dramatic alteration in 
West German public opinion. As the conservative preoccupation with 
unification receded in the national consciousness, recognition of two 
separate German states as a part of the status-quo post-war era became a 
rea l i ty .
The period from 1982 to the present has been marked by Helmut 
Kohl’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) government. During this period, 
the FRG rose to become the world’s third largest economy. Kohl has also 
presided over the German drive toward unification in the wake of the 
demise of the bipolar order.
Thus, the forty-plus years of foreign policy in the FRG have been 
marked by an incremental recapturing of sovereignty. As the F R G ’s 
international status improved and as the durability of its dem ocratic 
constitution was repeatedly tested, so too did its ability rise to control its 
destiny. In short, the last forty years have seen the FRG go from an 
occupied nation deprived of its sovereignty to a nation divided into two 
ideologically opposed states and into a unified, democratic country firmly 
integrated into the West.
A d e n au er  and a Supranat ional .  W e s te rn  O rientat ion
The defeat of Nazi Germany left Europe ravaged. Millions of lives 
were lost, millions were displaced from their homes, and millions more 
faced im minent starvation. The devastation of Germany was complete and 
all of Europe faced a daunting task of reconstruction. Thus, with both 
Germany and Europe no longer able to influence world politics in a 
meaningful way, the victorious powers settled into the confines of a 
bipolar world order.
The devastation of Germany provided an opportunity to 
fundamentally reconstitute its political and social system. Due to the 
rapidly deteriorating alliance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the 
Germans were given a new chance at statehood. In the East, the GDR was 
established as a socialist German state under dominating Soviet influence. 
In the West, a former mayor of Cologne sought to reconstitute the German 
state through closer ties to the West.
Konrad A denauer sought to support long-frustrated attempts at 
European integration while at the same time closely cooperating with 
American occupying authorities. His goal was to forever anchor the new 
Federal Republic in the Western camp. In doing so, he sought to 
incrementally regain German sovereignty and acceptance into the 
in terna tional com m unity .
Central to A denauer’s world view was that Franco-German 
rapprochement was critical to the Federal Republic’s ability to integrate 
into the European and world communities. Through its participation in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization' (NATO), the European Communities (EC),
and the Council of Europe, Adenauer hoped to eventually position the 
Federal Republic as an equal among the Western powers.
A denauer’s belief was that two factors limited the choices available 
to Germany. First was the fact of G erm any’s geopolitical location in the 
center of Europe. Second, the central position occupied by Germany left it 
sandwiched between two opposing ideological blocs. In order to survive, 
the Germans would have to choose sides if  they d idn’t want to be 
overwhelmed. The West was the obvious choice for Adenauer, because of 
“our form of life which has developed throughout many centuries and is 
based on the Christian humanistic view of the world.”22
A denauer’s Catholic background and childhood in the Rhineland, not 
far from the Franco-German border, convinced him that the Federal 
Republic’s best interests lay in a strong Western union:
Adenauer gave priority to W est European integration over the reunification  
o f Germany. Western integration for him was a means to tame German 
nationalism , to attain sovereignty , and to overcom e the traditional Franco- 
German h o s ti lity .22
Thus, A denauer felt that integration of Western Europe would strengthen 
the democratic institutions of the Federal Republic. At the same time, 
pursuing supranationalization and w esternization deepened the division of 
Germany and precluded any talk of German reunification in the near 
future. It was A denauer’s belief that these western ties would isolate the 
GDR. In effect, the “German question was to be solved [at a future date]
22 Frank Pfetsch, W est Germ any: In ternal S tructures  and External R e la tions:  Foreign  
Policy o f  the Federal Republic o f  Germany.  N ew  York: Praeger, 1988, p. 181.
23 Ibid., p. 183.
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from a position of strength with a 'magnetic effect' on the Eastern parts of 
Germany or Europe.”24
Detente  and the 
Development  o f  O s t p o l i t i k
A central feature of the F R G ’s foreign policy in the 1960s was the 
Hallstein Doctrine, which stated that the FRG would break off relations with 
any country that recognized the GDR. The doctrine attempted to isolate 
and alienate the socialist German state from the international community. 
However, the doctrine was ineffective. With the construction of the Berlin 
Wall and the deepening of alliance ties in both German states, the de fac to  
existence of two German states could not be denied.
A relaxation of tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the 
late 1960s engendered a dramatic shift in the FRG ’s foreign policy.
Whereas A denauer’s policy of a westernized FRG combined with a 
confrontational stance toward the East, the relaxation of superpower 
tensions offered, indeed required, a relaxation of inter-German tensions.
Enter the SPD mayor of Berlin, Willy Brandt, who formulated Ostpo l i t ik  as a 
practical and incremental way by which to lessen tensions and nurture 
in ter-G erm an contacts .
Western allies at first viewed O stpo l i t i k  with some suspicion. In 
particular, the French were concerned that such a German initiative might 
signal that the FRG was straying from its Western course and looking
24 Ibid., p. 187.
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toward the East with nostalgia. The FR G ’s Western allies feared that 
Germany might repeat history and conclude another Rapallo.
However, Ostpo l i t ik  did not seek to increase the F R G ’s Eastern 
relations at the expense of its carefully-crafted western integration.
The Ostpo li t ik  was not a policy o f  sw itching sides or a policy o f  balance 
between the East and W est, but was based on the foundations o f  the Western 
A lliance and a m ultinationally con ceived  concept. Brandt continuously  
em phasized that all important states within the Eastern bloc (those that had 
or have a com m on border with Germany) should be included in this policy  
and that the O s t p o l i t i k  should and would not be pursued individually or isolated  
in b ilateral re la tio n sh ip s.2 5
Thus, the FRG, like other nation-states in the global arena, acted 
opportunistically in taking advantage of detente. While the bipolar world 
order still acted as a constraint on the German ability to conduct its foreign 
relations, the FRG became less a passive object of the bipolar world order 
and more an active participant in it.
The FRG concluded treaties with Poland, the Soviet Union, and 
Czechoslovakia in 1970 and 1971 before concluding the Basic Treaty with 
the GDR. These treaties lessened tensions between the two blocs, 
renunciating the use of force, recognizing the inviolability of post-war 
borders, and respecting the sovereignty of each nation. In recognizing the 
status quo in Europe and in Germany, the FRG made great strides in 
promoting security in Europe. The conclusion of the treaties also helped 
the FRG to slowly eradicate the pariah image of Nazi Germany. The 
moralistic undercurrent of O stpo l i t ik  was evident when, in Decem ber 1970, 
then-Chancellor Willy Brandt knelt down at a Polish war memorial to those 
who died during the Warsaw Ghetto uprising.26
25 Ibid., p. 200.
26 Ibid., p. 209.
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Thus, O stpo l i t i k  provided the FRG with a number of benefits. In 
addition to recognizing what had long since been a reality--the division of 
Europe and the existence of two German states—the policy enabled the FRG 
to regain a modicum of control over the conduct of its foreign relations. It 
also served well as a venue through which the new G erm ans—citizens of 
the democratic FR G —could increase contacts with the East, despite the 
existence of an artificial division between East and West. In doing so, the 
West Germans were able to retain past links to the East; but perhaps more 
importantly, they were able to slowly erase the horrors of the Nazi regime.
The FRG Ascendent:  The  Internat ionalizat ion  
of  Fore ign Policy
O stp o l i t i k  served to enhance the Federal R epublic’s international 
image. Whereas the rigid intractability of the Hallstein Doctrine had 
created conflict and disruptions in the F R G ’s international relations, the 
consensus-building approach of Ostpolit ik  opened doors for the FRG to 
assume a greater role internationally. Through its participation in the 
United Nations, the European Community, and the Conference on Security 
and cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the West Germans increased their 
d ip lom atic  m aneuverab il i ty .
Perhaps most significant was the increasingly in terdependent world 
economy in which the FR G ’s export-oriented economy thrived. The rise of 
issues concerning economic disparities between the North and South, at the 
expense of the East-West conflict, also enabled the FRG to flex its economic 
power more effectively.
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Through its participation in the EC and the Lome Convention, the FRG 
saw its control over foreign policy increase substantially while the drive 
toward deeper economic integration decreased its authority over its 
domestic policy. As Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said in 1979, “As far as 
foreign policy is concerned, our freedom of action has increased, with 
regard to domestic policy it has definitely declined.”27 The more 
enlightened policy of O stpo l i t i k  created economic opportunities that would 
otherwise have remained closed to the F R G ’s export-oriented economy.
Schmidt continued to strengthen the Franco-German re la tionship  
through his personal relationship with French President Valery Giscard- 
D ’Estaing. Other developments in this period saw the FRG assuming a more 
active role in the Third World, using the following guidelines: no arms 
deliveries into areas of tension and no interference into the internal affairs 
of other states.
This period also witnessed continuing vindication for O stpo l i t ik .
Although reunification remained a stated goal of the FRG ’s Basic Law, a 
premium was placed on recognizing international realities by m aintaining 
stable and peaceful relations with the GDR. Policy makers and citizens in 
the Federal Republic understood that reunification was still possible, but 
only after a prolonged period of stability and peace had proved that 
Germans deserved a united country. As Helmut Schmidt said in his 1979 
state of the nation address,
The idea that one day a state o f  75 m illion Germans could arise in the 
m iddle o f  Europe arouses concern in many o f  our neighbors and 
partners in Europe...W e ought not overlook the fact that, in the eyes  
o f  others, the German division is today part o f  the European balance o f  
power that secures peace in Europe...In our geop olitica l p osition , and
27 Ibid., p. 219.
with our recent history, we Germans cannot allow  ourselves a political 
schizophrenia, which on the one hand pursues a realistic p olicy  o f  peace 
and at the sam e tim e carries on an illusionary debate about reun ification .2 8
The FRG as an Equal Partner
The ascendency in 1982 to the office of chancellor by conservative 
CDU leader Helmut Kohl again brought the national question to the 
forefront of the F R G ’s foreign policy efforts. However, even as the Federal 
Republic increased its stature as an economic power, external influences 
continued to limit the country’s ability to direct policy within the 
constraints of the bipolar order.
The renewal of East-West tensions after the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979 helped to chill inter-German relations. Multiple 
attempts at closer cooperation in the 1980s were thwarted and not until 
1987 did the East German leader Erich Honecker return to the Federal 
Republic for a visit to his home in the Saarland.29
The early 1980s were marked by the raging “Eurom issile” debate. 
W est German peace activists were not successful in preventing the 
deployment of the Pershing missiles but the vehem ence of their protests 
was a clear indication that Germans were no longer satisfied with being 
subordinate partners in the Atlantic alliance. The economic power wielded 
by the Federal Republic did not, even in the increasingly interdependent 
world, translate into corollary political power; the Federal Republic was 
still dependent on external factors for its security. As Josef Joffe noted in
28 Craig, op. cit., p. 309.
29 Pfetsch, op. cit., p. 172.
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the late 1980s, “The Federal Republic is still the most vulnerable member 
of the Western European state system, under a security deficit which only 
massive loans of power from the United States can cover. But as the 
ruptured defense consensus of the early 1980s dem onstrated, the comforts 
of protection also breed resentm ent—against the very Atlantic order that 
has determined W est German policy choices in decades past.”30
With the demise of the Soviet U nion’s influence in Eastern Europe, 
the Kohl government received an unexpected chance to attain German 
unity. The collapse of the East German economy and the cost to the FRG 
have created a unified Germany within the EC. EC members who initially 
feared an eastward-looking Germany have had those fears assuaged 
through G erm any’s continued com m itm ent to the European M onetary 
System (EMS) and its reaffirmation of its ties to the Atlantic Alliance.
To be sure, German unification occurred only with the hesitant 
consent of the victorious powers of World War II. W hat was a dramatic 
shift was the ability of both German states to participate in the “ two-plus- 
four” talks which ended the division of Germany and made unification 
possible. Although Helmut Kohl made the mistake of pandering to the far 
right when he questioned the legitimacy of the Polish-East German border, 
Germans have displayed a diplomatic saavy and adroitness lacking in their 
p re d e c e ss o rs .
In assuming a major financial burden to help the Soviet Union,
Germany is dem onstrating the leadership towards Eastern Europe that 
harkens back to earlier German ties to the East. However, in its 
contemporary guise, German financial assistance to the East has been less
30 Joffe, op. cit.,  p. 111.
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nefarious than some historical examples of German “ aid.” This is 
demonstrated particularly by the fact that Germany is providing half of all
international aid to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.31
S u m m a r y
If a characteristic of the F R G ’s foreign policy in the post-war period 
has been the subordination of its foreign policy to the bipolar order for the 
peace and security of Europe, it may well be a characteristic of its foreign 
policy in the 1990’s and beyond that it assumes the leadership role denied
to it since the end of World War II. The past 40 or so years of German
foreign policy have been characterized by a gradual regaining of
sovereignty. In the early post-war years, the FRG was under the
occupation yoke and subordinate to Allied decisions in most aspects of
domestic policy and total dominance in foreign affairs.
A denauer’s policies pursuing both a stronger W estern European 
union and Atlantic ties secured for the Federal Republic international 
legitimacy. These policies also served to rule out unification until such a 
time that the W est German state was securely integrated into the Western 
economic, political, and military system. The early and unflinching pro­
western stance allowed the FRG to secure American protection and a long 
term European presence; through the liberal economic order, the Federal 
Republic was able to reconstruct its economy and develop one of the 
largest export-oriented economies in the world.
31 Foreign Affairs, sp 1992 p. 126
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However, as the division of Germany and Europe was consolidated 
and became a precondition of the bipolar world order, German policy 
makers reacted with a policy which recognized this reality. Rather than 
dwell on its national division, policy makers engaged in a policy of peaceful 
coexistence. This was evidence of a new mentality in Germany which 
recognized its relative impotence, yet worked for positive change where 
possib le .
As Ostpolitik  became a fixture of the FR G ’s foreign policy, it assumed 
greater leeway in other aspects of its primarily economic foreign policy.
As a m ember of the Group of Seven and multiple international 
organizations, the FRG increased its international legitimacy. Its regular 
support for United Nations’ resolutions and EC policy stances indicated that 
it was indeed an increasingly important member of the world community.
However, until the demise of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and 
the ensuing events that made possible German unification, the FRG 
remained dependent on the U.S. for its basic territorial security. With the 
demise of the bipolar order, Germany could assume greater control over its 
foreign policy. This is evidenced in its increasing ties to Eastern Europe 
and its unilateral recognition of Slovenian and Croatia independence.
Finally, as the Federal Republic regained sovereignty and greater 
flexibility in the conduct of its international affairs, the German polity 
underwent a significant change. The reaction to Nazism in the 1950s was 
dramatic, but not to the extent that all vestiges of German nationalism 
were eradicated. The development of a strong political party system, best 
identified with the broad-based Christian Democrats, allowed the political 
system to largely eliminate the fractious divisiveness that was 
characteristic of the Weimar parliamentary system. As the institutions of
representative democracy in the Federal Republic were consolidated, the 
German populace began to identify with them.
Also indicative of a dramatic change in the political culture and 
identity o f  Germans in the post-war era is the popularity of the pan- 
European ideal. Integration in the European Community initially provided 
the Federal Republic with international legitimacy and stable foundations 
for Franco-German amity and economic reconstruction. Today, a 
generation of Germans born after World War II have lived with both the 
guilt of Germany’s Nazi past and the success of European integration. It is 
clear to the overwhelming majority of this generation that G erm any’s 
future lies in tandem with E urope’s. In short, this new political generation 
adheres to the idea that a more European Germany should supersede a 
more German Europe.32
32 Pfetsch, op. cit .,  p. 132.
Chapter  3: Germany and the EC; Expanding the Scope and Level
o f  European Integrat ion
Solving the German Question in a European Context
The German Question, as noted in the preceding chapter, generally 
comprises two different problems. The first refers to G erm any’s crucial 
role in the stabilization, or destabilization, of Europe. The country’s 
geographic position and internal political structures often resulted in 
closely tying Germany’s actions to Europe’s fate.
The second problem of the German Question refers to the post-war 
division o f  Germany and Europe and the political and social problems that 
resulted from it. The resulting stability provided by the two blocs made 
Europeans and the superpowers hesitant to take political action to address 
the German Question. It seemed better to have a divided Germany, with a
limited role in Europe, than to have risked opening old wounds by
attempting to resolve the German Question.
Thus, the German Question “does not belong to the Germans alone: it 
can only be solved in a European context.” 1 This truth is demonstrated by
the Western A llies’ decision at the end of World War II to incorporate
G erm any’s western zone into the economic, political, and military fabric of 
the West. Rather than reducing Germany to an agrarian state isolated and 
dominated by her European neighbors, the Western Allies understood well 
that such a system would be unrealistic and unstable. For in the wake of
1 W olfgang Heisenberg, ed., G erm an Unification in E uropean P erspec t ive .  Brussels: 
Centre for European Policy Studies, 1991, p. 5.
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the war, it was clear that German economic reconstruction was imminent. 
Consequently, a reordering of economic and political structures in Europe 
was required if  Europeans were to rebuild alongside vanquished Germany.
A number of factors in the post-war order then prompted a new 
drive for European integration. In addition to recognizing G erm any’s 
inevitable reconstruction, Europeans faced a continent that had 
experienced horrendous physical destruction—both o f  the economic 
infrastructure and the human population. This created a twofold threat in 
the emergent bipolar world: that Europe would be subjected to the 
economic hegemony of the United States and vulnerable militarily to the 
Soviet Union. There was a new urgency among Europeans to form the 
structures and institutions necessary for Europe to politically and 
econom ically  assert itself.
Numerous attempts in the early post-war years were made to 
enhance the position of W estern Europe through integrative processes.
The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was 
established to administer Marshall Fund recovery aid and to work to 
establish free trade practices in Western Europe. Later this organization 
expanded into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) which “ brought worldwide membership and thus gave expression to 
the world liberal trading area which forms part of the environm ent within 
which the EC has taken root.”2
In addition to economic organizations, defense and human rights 
organizations sprouted. The Brussels Treaty of 1948 was a mutual
2 Ali M. El-Agraa, ed., The Economics o f  the European Community.  N ew  York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1990, p. 22.
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assistance pact between Britain, France, and the Benelux countries, which 
recognized the traditional German threat as well as the emerging Soviet 
threat. A year later, the Council of Europe, a group with wide-ranging 
political and cultural objectives was created. It sought to emphasize the 
common heritage of Western Europe based on similar spiritual and moral 
values, legalism, and dem ocracy .3 These organizations fell short of 
attaining widespread membership. They also failed to allay fears of 
W estern European countries, particularly France, that the impending 
reconstruction and remilitarization of West Germany was a painfully 
familiar threat to their future security.
This chapter seeks to clarify Germany's relationship with the EC. In 
particular, what does Germany gain from continued membership in the EC? 
W hat policies demonstrate German commitment to strengthening the EC? 
And, finally, how will a reunified Germany continue to support the EC 
w ithout overw helm ing its other members?
In its infancy, West European integration was guided by and 
beholden to the international context in which it originated. American 
economic dominance led the way to a liberal capitalist world economy; 
consequently, W est Europeans served as a bulwark of confrontation 
between the W estern liberal capitalist world and the Soviet-dominated 
socialist bloc.
The dominance of the U.S. economy was slowly eroded in the late 
1960s and 1970s by rapid economic growth in Japan and Western Europe. 
The post-war economic order faltered as prior rules and institutions
3 Anthony J.C. Kerr, The Common M arket and How it Works.  Oxford: Pergamon Press, 
1986, p. 196.
governing that order became increasingly ineffective. This created a 
situation in which “the international economic context within which the EC 
functioned in the 1970s was marked by a much higher degree of 
turbulence than had been the case in the previous two decades.”4 In the 
1980s, economic and technological competition between the U.S., Japan, 
and W estern Europe dominated the global economy, forcing the Soviet 
Union under Mikhail Gorbachev to attempt to join the world capitalist 
s y s te m .
Thus, the development of the EC had, until the end of the Cold War, 
occurred within the confines of East-W est bipolarity. The progress and 
stagnation of the EC depended largely on the current nature of East-W est 
re la t io n s :
The level o f  East-W est tension affected the degree o f  internal unity 
o f  the EC; it interacted with econom ic factors to change the relationship  
between the EC and the United Slates; and it affected EC external relations 
indirectly  through its in fluence on perceptions o f  d evelop m en ts  
in the Third World and in Eastern Europe.3
However, as the U.S. was increasingly unable or unwilling to act as the 
stabilizing force of the world economy, the EC adopted a greater political 
role for itself. In doing so, there were frequently conflicts of interest 
between the EC and the U.S.
Today, the EC still operates within the limits of the international 
system. However, since the mid 1980s it has gained for itself greater 
flexibility in promoting its interests in the international arena. Due to the
4 Stephen George, Polit ics  and P o licy  in the European Community.  Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1991, p. 35.
5 Ibid., p. 36.
strength of its economy, Germany has also found for itself a greater 
international role. Indeed, one can note with some accuracy that the 
interests of the EC and Germany have become, for better or worse, 
in te r tw in e d .
As in other potential foreign policy dilemmas for Germany, the 
answers to the above questions lie in the country's economic capabilities 
and her domestic political requirements and capabilites. As the richest 
and by far the largest member of the EC, Germany will have to exercise 
great care in asserting its national will within the framework of the EC. In 
the past, Germany's support for the EC was justified because it was first a 
ticket to international respectability, and then because it ensured 
continued econom ic growth. In the future, observers wonder whether 
these same reasons will be enough to keep Germany in the EC as an ardent 
supporter of integration.
The following section examines the historical dimension of West 
Germany's involvement in the EC. It explains the decisive shift in foreign 
policy orientation that occurred in W est Germany under Adenauer's 
chancellorship, and provides a background for understanding German 
reunification as it affects the EC.
A Change in Foreign Policy Orientation
In May 1950 French Foreign M inister Robert Schuman proposed 
placing French and German (and that of other interested European 
countries) iron, steel, and coal production under the auspices o f  a “High 
A uthority” which would have decision-m aking predominance in that 
industry over national governments. The recognition that W est G erm any’s
economic revival was inevitable led the French to the conclusion that their 
best interests were not in blocking that development, but in controlling it. 
In essence, the Schuman Plan was a security policy for France that was 
also in the interests of other European nations. While it controlled the
German behemoth from within, it also gave Europeans a more united voice
in the bipolar order. One observer has noted the
boldness o f  the Schuman Plan as a solution to the most deep-seated  
problem o f  French foreign policy: if  the German econom y  
[its production o f  iron, coal and steel, the main tools o f  war] could
not be contained on a discrim inatory basis, then France would
propose to place what were thought to be its core elem ents, and 
those o f  its own econom y too, under a system  o f  control external 
to both.6
By making war with Germany “ unthinkable but also materially 
impossible,” France was taking a significant first step in realizing a 
“European federation which is indispensable to peace.”7
For the French the ECSC would provide them with security against 
any possible future German aggression. For the West Germans, the 
organization provided international respectability  and was the best way to 
break free from postwar economic restrictions placed on them. For 
Western Europe in general the plan provided an opportunity to strenghten 
it against an economically pervasive American ally.8
The first German chancellor in the post-war era, Konrad Adenauer, 
embraced the European Community as an opportunity for W est Germany
6 A. W. DePorte, Europe Between the Superpowers.  New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1986, p. 223.
7 Edward Nevin, The Economics o f  Europe. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, p. 8.
8 Dennis Swann, The Econom ics o f  the Common Market.  6th Edition. London: Penguin  
Books, 1990.
to transform itself from pariah to partner. According to Adenauer:
...the purpose o f  his [Schum an’s] proposal was not econom ic, but 
em inently  political...R earm am ent a lw ays show ed first in an 
increased production o f  coal, iron, and steel. If any organization  
such as he was proposing were to be set up it would enable each 
country to detect the first signs o f  rearmament, and would have 
an extraordinarily calm ing e ffec t in F ran ce...S ch um an ’s plan 
corresponded entirely with the ideas I had been advocating for a 
long tim e concerning the integration o f  the key industries o f  
Europe. I informed Schuman at once that I accepted this proposal 
w h o le h e a r te d ly  , 9
Thus, the ECSC was the first integrative attempt that encouraged, 
indeed necessitated, West G erm any’s participation. As an offspring of the 
Cold War, the Federal Republic under Adenauer understood that pursuing 
a pro-American, hard-line anticommunist policy was critical to regaining 
international acceptance and respectability. Though A denauer and much 
of the German electorate still gave lip service to the importance of 
reunification with the Soviet-dominated German Democratic Republic 
(GDR), the real and seemingly more attainable goal was to attend to the 
economic and political reconstruction of the Federal Republic through 
integration with the West.
Two domestic political developments in early post-w ar W est 
Germany solidified the CD U ’s position and set the country on a policy 
course that positively influenced the coun try ’s attitudes towards the EC. 
The first was A denauer’s move to remake W est G erm any’s national 
identity. The second was to follow Economics Minister Ludwig E rhard’s 
recom m endation to pursue free-market and free trade p r inc ip le s .10
9 Quoted in Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, A H istory o f  West G erm any.v .  I. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1989, p. 266.
10 George, op. cit., p. 66.
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the national identity of 
Germans in the wake of World War II bore the heavy legacy of the Nazis. 
As an ardent anticommunist, Adenauer promoted W est Germany as a 
staunchly pro-W estern, pro-integration country. The best things from 
Germany were promoted as West German and the West German electorate 
gradually identified with this stance.
The acceptance of the western-oriented economy also helped secure 
support for W est German participation in Western integration. W hether or 
not the “economic miracle” could have happened with other policies as well 
is insignificant; what was important was that the West German electorate 
linked economic and foreign policy successes with Adenauer’s CDU. Thus, 
in a bold choice of foreign policy orientations, Adenauer solidly entrenched 
the West Germans into the desired pro-W estern, pro-American im age .11
Other political parties had to adjust their stances in 
acknowledgement of the CDU successes in the 1950s and early 1960s. In 
particular, the SPD had to abandon its advocacy of neutrality as the price 
of German unity. The pursuit of a new and less confrontational policy 
towards the East began in 1969 when the SPD and the Free Democratic 
Party (FDP) formed a coalition government. Many observers in both W est 
Germany and in the EC feared that O stpo l i t i k  signalled a historical 
throwback to Rapallo, when in 1922 the German government concluded 
secret agreements with the 
Soviet Union.
However, SPD Chancellor Willy Brandt was careful to assuage those 
fears. He sought U.S. support for his policies in Eastern Europe and was
11 Ibid., p. 68.
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careful to reiterate the Federal Republic’s staunch support for the EC. 
Although his Chancellorship ignobly came to an abrupt end in 1974 with 
the discovery of an East German agent in his cabinet, he left his successor, 
Helmut Schmidt, with a clear mandate to continue Ostpoli t ik .
Under Schmidt, the Federal Republic came into its own as a world 
power. The economic success of West Germany had endowed its citizens 
with greater confidence to assert itself diplomatically. The late 1970s and 
early 1980s also witnessed the strengthening of the Franco-German core of 
the EC, based on the close personal relationship between Schmidt and 
French President Valery Giscard D'Estaing. Although Schmidt was a Social 
Democrat and D'Estaing a conservative-liberal, the two in reality were not 
politically far apart .12
By the early 1980s West Germany had firmly established itself as an 
economic power, a staunch supporter of the Western Alliance, and the 
leader of the EC. Schmidt and his FDP Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher pursued O stp o l i t i k  within a larger framework of continued 
support for NATO.
Commensurate with the beginning of the Reagan Administration in 
1981, security issues again came to dominate the West German domestic 
policy agenda. The hard-line anticommunist stance of the Reagan 
Administration threw West Germany's political coalition into chaos.
Schmidt, who supported deployment of NATO Pershing II missiles, was 
assailed by both ends of the spectrum: on the left wing by his own SPD, 
which sought a less confrontational stance towards the East, and on the 
right wing by the Christian Social Union (CSU) for not unconditionally
12 Ibid., p .71.
supporting the American position. Schmidt was given a vote of no 
confidence by the Bundestag in 1982, and CDU Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
replaced him.
During this time, W est German leaders consistently sought to 
reassure their Atlantic and European allies that the country was indeed 
committed to the West. A Rappallo was simply not possible. As Schmidt 
stated in a 1980 speech to the Bundestag:
As far as the future o f  the German nation is concerned, we must soberly  
conclude that the political constellations in the world and in Europe at the 
present time do not offer possib ilities to overcom e the d ivision  o f  Germ any... 
The division o f  Germany is at the same time the division o f  Europe. In a 
concrete sense, this m eans that the German problem is on ly  soluble  
in a European context. Everything that Europeans on both sides can do in 
order to sm ooth thtrenches between us and create greater solidarity is at 
the sam e time o f  service to the German cau se .1 2
Schmidt thus repeatedly stated an accepted truth in post-war foreign 
policy: that the German Question was one for all of Europe to decide.
In another example, Genscher noted that W est Germans and 
Europeans who com plained about security dependence on America were 
actually discontent that a common European voice was lacking:
W hoever in Europe com plains about the dependence on Am erica, 
com plains in reality about insufficien t progress toward European unity... 
The supreme peace task for Europe and for the world today concerns the 
pursuit o f  as constructive an East-W est relationship as p o ss ib le .14
Such comments help demonstrate the significant shift in traditional 
German foreign policy since Bismarck. The ability of political leaders like 
Genscher and Schmidt to articulate a German foreign policy to be pursued
12 Verheyen, op. c it ., 164.
14 Ibid., p. 165.
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in a larger Western and European framework represents a diplomatic 
sensitivity that was not common in pre-1945 German statesmen.
To be sure, this has not eliminated remarks by German leaders that 
have the potential to offend. As Germans rushed to reunify in 1990,
Chancellor Kohl attempted to retain the electoral support of right wing 
expellees from the East bloc by not ruling out any international boundary 
changes. By hesitating to declare the Oder-Neisse line as the definitive 
border with Poland, Kohl convinced Europeans of the necessity to bind the 
new Germany firmly to the Western alliance.15
The growth and development of the EC and Germany's role within it 
has been vast and complex. In the next section, I will examine a number 
of programs which demonstrate the extent of G ermany's com m itm ent to 
strengthening the EC and the degree to which German reunification 
changes the political and institutional landscape of the EC. The impact of 
debates on the intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) on monetary union 
and political cooperation will be examined, as will Germany's position on 
enlarging the EC.
German Reunification and the EC
The reunification of Germany implied the inclusion of the former 
lands of East Germany in the European Community. Two constitutional 
paths to a new German state were evident. The first was found in Article 
23 of the Basic Law by which East German Laender could opt for
15 Ibid., p. 199.
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membership in the Federal Republic. Another possible route was found in 
Article 146 of the Basic Law which provided for a new constitution 
resulting from negotiations between the two German sta tes .16
N either Article 23 nor Article 146 provided an ideal route to 
unification. Article 23 referred to pre-1937 borders and was consequently 
unacceptable to the Soviet Union and Poland. Article 146 was also a 
suspect route for it would ignore the external realities: allies from both the 
West and East would have had vehement objections to a reunification 
process that excluded their input.
Thus, in the “ two plus four” talks, the two German states and France, 
Britain, the Soviet Union, and the U.S.A., German reunification was 
achieved. Article 23 was repealed in the German Bundestag and the 
international “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to G erm any” 
became its counterpart in international law.
Chancellor Kohl, wary of repeating the Oder-Neisse diplomatic 
disaster, (in which he questioned the inviolability of the Oder-Neisse River 
as a permanent border) presented his view of German reunification as a 
European issue to the Bundestag on November 28, 1989. He concluded 
that although reunification remained "the political objective o f  the Federal 
Republic," a firm link was "necessary between the developm ent of intra- 
German unity and the establishment of a secure political architecture for 
Europe as a w hole."17
16 Heisenberg, op. cit., p. 28.
17 Ibid., p. 18.
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Maastricht:  A Move Towards  Monetary Union  
an il Pol it ical  C ooperat ion
In December 1991, EC leaders met in the Dutch town of Maastricht to 
formulate treaties on monetary union (EMU) and political cooperation 
(EPC). The agreements chart the course of the EC towards an eventual 
European Union. Several elements of the treaty—a single currency, a 
common foreign and defense policy, a common citizenship—seem to lay the 
foundation for a federal Europe. However, other observers suggest that 
the agreements on EMU and EPC merely enable the Community to meet the 
emerging challenges of helping Eastern Europe and creating a more 
effic ient m a rk e t .18
In April 1990, in conjunction with French President Francois 
Mitterand, Helmut Kohl proposed the two intergovernmental conferences. 
Pointing to the dramatically  changing international environm ent, Kohl 
suggested that the EC could only progress if the reforms proposed by the 
IGCs were ratified by national parliaments by the end of 1992:
Only if  these reforms [on common defense and security policy and EM U] 
reach a su ccessfu l conclusion w ill the European Community be able to 
m eet the ch a llen ges facing it internally and externally  and to shoulder  
its share o f  political and econom ic responsibility for the w hole o f  Europe 
and towards its partners in the w orld .1 9
The EMU
18 (Economist: Dec. 14, 1991, 52)
19 Axel Krause, Inside the New Europe. New York: Harper Collins, 1991, p. 308.
Among the objectives Kohl ranked highly, the establishment of EMU 
and a common defense and foreign policy perhaps best dem onstrate the 
extent to which Germany will pursue her own interests through a 
European framework. The EMU serves as an excellent example of 
Germany's com mittment to the European federal idea.
Since the end of the Second World War, the Germans have struggled 
to associate their national identity with symbols untainted by the country's 
past. Germans have no royal family; the national flag has been altered in 
acknowledgement of the country's destructive imperial past; and any 
display of nationalist sentiment has traditionally drawn the ire of her 
European neighbors.
To Germans, the great national sysmbol of pride has become the 
hallowed Deutsche-mark. In a country where instability and political 
fragmentation has historically wrought disastrous results, the stable and 
strong D mark has become a symbol of the West Germans' successful 
transformation into a powerful economy and stable democracy.
Maastricht set the timetable for European Monetary Union at 1999. 
The treaty set standards to attain a single currency (ECU). Chancellor Kohl 
assured worried Germans that surrendering the D-mark to a European 
currency would not end their cherished monetary stability. Five criteria 
must be met before the EC members qualify for the single currency. First, 
there must be price stability. The inflation rate of a country seeking to 
qualify should not be more than 1.5% above the average of the three EC 
countries with the lowest prices.
Second, long term interest rates must be within two percentage 
points of the average of the three- members with the lowest rates. Third, 
national budget deficits must be less than 3% of Gross Domestic Product
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(GDP). Fourth, the public-debt ratio must not exceed 60% of GDP. And 
finally, national currencies must not have been devalued in the past two 
years and must have remained within the normal 2.25% fluctuation 
margins o f  the exchange rate m echanism.20
These stringent criteria are designed to ensure the stability of the 
single currency once it does come into existence. However, the momentum 
toward monetary union can be seen, in light of the M aastricht proposal, in 
two different perspectives. First, it can be seen as an effort by Germany's 
European neighbors to attempt to "craft an instrument that promised to 
provide a counterweight to the preponderant and growing influence of 
Germany." By tying Germany's greatest asset, the D-mark, into a European 
monetary framework, Germany's EC allies were attempting to ensure that 
the country would find its interests in European cooperation in the long 
r u n . 2 1
From the German perspective, they were willing to support the 
European initiative, believing that in the long term German interests would 
be best served by allowing European input into their financial and security 
futures. "That effort was willingly supported by policy-makers from both 
governing and opposition parties, whose perceptions of German interests 
went far beyond complicated financial questions to the most fundamental 
questions of security. In short, a shared sense of history may plausibly be 
seen as shaping a basic consensus among German leaders—some of whom 
probably thought about the extension of German power, while others
20 (Econom ist, Dec. 24., 52)
21 Louis Pauly, "The Politics o f  Euopean Monetary Union: National Strategies, 
International Im plications," In te r n a t io n a l  Jou rna l,  xlvii w inter 1991-2, p. 102.
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thought about its containm ent."22
Political  Cooperat ion; The G u if
With regard to a common defense and foreign policy, Kohl recognized 
the importance of a united European voice in those areas. Referring to the 
E C ’s less-than-uniform policy stance towards the Persian Gulf and the 
Yugoslavian crises, Kohl said
It rem ains our conviction  that unification is incom plete w ithout fully  
includ ing developm ent p o licy . It remains our con v iction  that unification  
is incom plete without fully including security p olicy  and hence defense  
matters in the long term. Particularly the events o f  recent m onths have 
made it clear to us that we need an effective set o f  instruments in order to 
bring our com m on interests to bear even better in the w orld .2 2
The difficulties of establishing a common defense and foreign policy 
among the twelve EC members, each of whom has widely divergent 
perceptions and expectations of their role in the world, are numerous. In 
the case of Germany anxieties about their proper role in the world are 
particularly acute. Although Germany has begun to dem onstrate greater 
assertiveness in foreign policy, she hesitates to seize the initiative for fear 
of renewing neighbors’ fears of a return to G erm any’s militant past. The 
current leadership of reunited Germany primarily consists of an older 
generation who are acutely sensitive to G erm any’s legacy. Indeed, the 
quandry of making the transition to a more responsible and less inhibited 
foreign policy is summarized as follows:
22 Ibid.. p. 103.
22 Krause, op. cil., p. 309.
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C hancellor Kohl and other older Germans in high o ffic e  feel an urgent need 
to knit their country into an interwoven Europe before ceding their posts 
to a generation they fear might be less inhibited by German history and 
therefore less European. And many Germans, who in the past enjoyed  
in v isib le  American security but felt m orally superior because they did not 
have to dirty their own hands with fighting, may w ell gain more appreciation  
for the United States as they them selves inherit part o f  the old American  
secu rity  fu n c tio n .24
This problem first revealed itself in 1990 during the Gulf crisis. As 
the possibility of war became greater the EC (and by extension the 
Germans) acted indecisively and ineffectively. In the EC in general there 
was a question of what institutions would take action. Germans were 
preoccupied with unification and the cost of supporting the Soviet U nion’s 
troop withdrawals from eastern Germany. However, Americans and others 
who were critical of Germany’s tepid support of the Gulf crisis failed to 
understand the constitutional restraints on German leaders.
G erm any’s Basic Law contains three articles which did not offer 
German leaders a clear rationale for taking part in the material support of 
the Gulf crisis. Article 24 states that “The Federation may enter a system 
of mutual collective security; in doing so it will consent to such limitations 
upon its sovereignty as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting 
order in Europe and among the nations of the world.” Article 26 was 
equally vague: “ Acts tending to and undertaken to disturb the peaceful 
relations between nations, especially to prepare for aggressive war, shall 
be unconstitutional. They shall be made a punishable offense.” And 
finally, Article 87a states that “The Federation shall build up Armed Forces 
for defence purposes...Apart from defence, the Armed Forces may only be
24 Elizabeth Pond, “Germany in the New  Europe,” Foreign  Affairs ,  vol. 17, no. 2, 
Spring 1992, p. 115
used to the extent explicitly permitted by law.”25
There was a great deal of debate in the Federal Republic as to what 
was prohibited by these articles. Initially, there was a conflict between 
Kohl's CDU and the opposition SPD as to which articles applied to the Gulf 
crisis. The SPD believed the sentence '"Apart from defence, the Armed 
Forces may only be used to the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic 
Law' implied that the use of German force anywhere outside the NATO 
area was p rohib ited ."26
Helmut Kohl was inclined to interpret the Basic Law in a way which 
would allow him to repay the United States for its support of reunification. 
In his opinion, it was time for Germany to assume the leadership role it 
had earned. And he believed that if  Germany was to be respected as a 
world power, it needed to make a contribution towards security and 
stability outside of Europe and not jus t within.
However, in September of 1990 Kohl bowed to domestic pressure 
and instead pledged financial and economic support and pledged to try to 
lift some of the constitutional restraints on "offensive" German military 
ac t iv i ty .27 Despite the reservations of the German public, the country did 
commit forces as part of NATO's obligation to Turkey, sent Patriot missiles 
to Israel, and sent a flotilla of minesweepers after the war to clean up the 
Gulf.
Thus, while the Germans did contribute financial and, to a lesser 
extent, material support to the Gulf crisis, they were criticized by all sides.
25 Basic Law o f  the FRG, Federal Information O ffice, Bonn.
26 Trevor Salm on, “Testing Tim es for European Political C ooperation,” I n te r n a t i o n a l  
A ffa irs ,  68, no. 2, 1992, p. 235.
27 Ibid., p. 238.
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Germany's hesitation to station fighter personnel and aircraft in Turkey 
prompted some to suggest hypocrisy, having been the recipient of NATO 
protection for over 40 years. Yet, criticism was also levied at the Germans 
for refusing in line with its policy of not exporting arms to areas of 
te n s io n .28
Thus, in the Gulf crisis Germany was hampered in pursuing a 
decisive policy with clear popular support because of three factors. First, 
the Germans, like other EC members, had no clear institutionalized 
decision-making process within the framework of the EC. Second, the 
Germans also had their own constitutional restraints to consider, unlike 
many other EC actors. And, finally, the legacy of German militarism 
prompted a maelstrom of public opinion at home and abroad, denying 
German leaders of a clear mandate from their allies and domestic 
constituencies. Formulating a coherent and just policy in the face of so 
many cross pressures proved extremely difficult for the Germans who 
were already preoccupied with the reunification process.
The Crisis in Yugoslavia
The initial EC response to the crisis in Yugoslavia in the spring of 
1991 was to levy economic and diplomatic pressure on Serbians in order to 
prevent the imminent disintegration of that country. Since over 50 
percent of Yugoslavia's foreign trade was with EC members it was assumed 
that the country's leaders would respond to Western pleas to prevent civil 
war and disintegration. EC leaders hoped that their previous relationship
28 Ibid., p .238.
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with Yugoslavia and the future dominant role the community would play 
in European affairs would influence Belgrade to pursue a peaceful solution 
to the crisis.29
Into the fall of 1991 the threat of sanctions had been applied by the 
EC to Serbia through weakly worded statements that failed to deter the 
emboldened Serbian governments. Frequent visits to Belgrade by EC 
emissaries failed to emphasize to the Serbian leadership the EC position on 
solving the crisis through force.
As violence mounted in the breakaway republics of Croatia and 
Slovenia, public opinion in Germany favored a strong German response. 
With many Croatians living in Germany as permanent residents, the crisis 
was brought home to many Germans to a degree not found in other EC 
member states. In addition, the Roman Catholic Croatians and Slovenians 
found the favor of Kohl's Christian Democrat/Christian Social Unions, who 
saw aid to the region as a religious duty.30
German leaders were hesitant to recognize Croatia and Slovenia 
outside of the framework of EC cooperation. Yet, as 1991 progressed, 
domestic pressure to take action combined with the EC's ineffectiveness to 
prompt German leaders to consider recognizing Croatian and Slovenian 
sovereignty. This would recognize that the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
was irreversible and that the establishment of a Greater Serbia was against 
the best interests of Europe as a whole. In recognizing the republics, 
Germany would also be seizing the initiative in its foreign policy to a 
greater extent than at anytime in the post-war era.
29 Ibid., p. 249.
30 Ibid., p. 252.
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The Germans also felt that some EC members would follow their lead.
As pressure mounted, EC foreign ministers met to adopt a resolution 
allowing the recognition of republics under general tests that included 
human rights guarantees, rights for minorities, com m ittm ents to changing 
borders through peaceful means, and com m ittm ents to non-proliferation  
and arms control. In December 1991, they stated that if  the republics met 
these goals the EC states could recognize them by January 15, 1992.31
When Germany extended formal recognition to the republics on 
December 23, Kohl hailed it as "a great victory for German foreign policy."
In response to Belgrade's claims that Germany was trying to build a sphere 
of influence as a foundation for a Fourth Reich, Kohl stated, "We Germans 
are concerned about the fate of these people and about their future in 
dem ocracy—nothing else." 32
Thus, the early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia represented a new 
German assertiveness in foreign policy that was criticized in many 
quarters. Not only did the Germans break out of the Community mold, but 
they welcomed the opportunity to do so. This new German willingness to 
take the initiative in foreign policy matters is clearly indicative of the 
Germans flexing diplomatic muscle com m ensurate with their status as a 
world power.
Germany's bold move to defuse tension in Yugoslavia by recognizing 
the country's inevitable disintegration signalled an end to its political 
deference and meekness. Some in the EC are particularly sensitive about 
the German willlingness to take its own route to crisis management.
31 Ibid., p. 253.
3 2 International H e ra ld  Tribune , Dec. 24, 1991, p .l.
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According to one French EC official, ’"You get the feeling that the Germans 
are thinking, 'We've reached the limits of what we can do for others and 
now we have to take care of ourselves.'" 33
Yet, the Germans are caught in a seemingly inescapable bind as they 
attempt to help reforge a European consensus while at the same time 
seizing an appropriate role. As was highlighted by the Gulf and 
Yugoslavian crises, the Germans are susceptible to criticism from those 
who feel they do too little, and from those who feel they are assuming too 
much initiative. As one German diplomat said, "It's another case of 
damned if  you do, damned if you don't."34 The German experience with 
European political cooperation is inextricably linked to the designs o f  the 
security framework of Europe. In the aftermath of the Soviet pullout in 
the East, the threat of traditional animosities resurfacing is increasingly 
evident. Also, Europeans are justifiably concerned that a German hegemon 
lies in their midst without the comforting restraints of a superpower 
presence. The next chapter examines these security concerns in the wake 
of bipolarity, noting both the concerns of the countries involved and the 
steps that Germans have taken to assuage those concerns.
33 Ibid., p. 1.
34 Ibid., p. 1.
Chapter  4; U n ited  Germany a n d  European Security
With the end of the bipolar order and German reunification, 
traditional security structures in Europe are undergoing a dramatic 
transition. The security arrangements of the Cold W ar—bipolarity, 
the division of Europe and Germany into spheres o f  influence—no
longer apply in light of the dramatic changes in Europe in the last
three years. The debate has shifted from one characterized by the 
East-West conflict to one in which the speed of the transition to new 
security arrangem ents and the very com position of these security 
arrangem ents is highly contentious.
As with other issues discussed in this thesis, G erm any’s role in 
the new security apparatus is a matter of grave concern to the 
international community. For forty years the bipolar order had kept 
Germany divided; to her European neighbors, this was synonymous 
with peace. Although Germany remains a central factor in the 
European security debate, this time it will be as a policy formulator 
and not merely an object of Western security policy.
The very notion of what constitutes security is also debatable.
The threat to Europe today is less of a military invasion by Russia 
than it is one of the spread of destabilizing regional tensions—as in 
Yugoslavia. Indeed, attempting to define what constitutes security 
threats and thus the new “architecture” of a European security 
system is an almost impossible task. W e may only hypothesize on
the process of establishing new security structures. As one
com m enta tor has noted:
The new  security system  in Europe is unlikely to be produced through 
bargains struck by statesm en—as happened four decades ago— 
but rather w ill evo lve, step by step, from a host o f  developm ents  
that cannot all yet be divined. Virtually all o f  the states have 
pluralistic  so c ie tie s  and advanced , interdependent econ om ies: and 
many factors in the security eq u ation —both ch a llen ge and r e sp o n se -  
w ili be determined by the success or failure o f  political and econom ic  
exp erim en ts w ithin individual s ta te s .. . .1
The W estern security frameworks established during the Cold 
W ar—anchored on NATO with peripheral organizations such as the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the 
Western European Union (W EU )—have partially laid the groundwork 
for a new security system that is effective in crisis management and 
confidence building. However, any new security system in Europe 
must encom pass a culturally, politically, and econom ically  diverse 
body o f  nations which possess sometimes divergent security 
imperatives. Thus, the process of establishing an inclusionary 
security fram ework that reflects the changing security atm osphere 
will be an arduous and gradual one. The only accepted fact is that 
existing Western security organizations such as NATO must move 
beyond the traditional confines of the East-W est conflict.
Given the remarkable fluidity of events in Europe, it is perhaps 
more useful to identify the central issues involved than it is to make 
concrete statements as to the exact structures of the new security 
system. The central issues of the new European security structure
1 Robert Hunter, “The Future o f  European Security,” The W ash in g ton  
Q u a r te r ly ,  vol. 13, no. 3, p. 57.
include: 1) the maintenance of the Atlantic link with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and facilitating German 
“containment” within NATO; 2) the possibility of institutionalizing the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); and, finally, 
3) the strengthening of a “European pillar” within the Atlantic 
alliance and the establishment of a Franco-German brigade.
Germany occupies a central role in each of these prospective 
new arrangements. NATO for years served a dual role: containing 
the Soviets and containing the West Germans within a Western 
security framework. While the disintegration of the Soviet Union has 
deprived NATO of that function, many Europeans and Americans 
would like to see NATO remain on the continent to allay fears of a 
reunited and unfettered German military.
The CSCE represents the only security body which encompasses 
both Eastern and Western European nations. However, it is merely a 
consultative body which makes recom m endations only unanim ously. 
W ithout some institutionalization of decision-making and a method 
of binding member states to its decisions, the CSCE will remain an 
ineffective consultative body with no power to formulate or 
implement security policy. As Germany is located in roughly the 
geographic center of the CSCE map, both its role and its obligations 
are of central importance.
For years, the establishment of a European defense pillar 
within NATO has foundered on the lukewarm enthusiasm of  the nine 
members of the Western European Union (WEU). Recent attempts to 
strengthen the European pillar through the pursuit of a Franco- 
German “Eurocorps” demonstrate that Europeans, with Germans at
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the forefront, are seeking an expansion of security functions 
commensurate with their political and economic clout.
Before discussing Germany's role in the em erging security 
order in Europe, it is necessary to understand both the international 
and domestic implications surrounding German reunification. In 
particular, the conditions surrounding the "Two plus Four" 
negotiations on German reunification must be examined. The role of 
the Soviet Union in these talks is significant, both because it was 
unexpectedly flexible about the conditions for Germany's 
reunification and because its internal political position weakened its 
ability to exercise greater control over the dissolution of its former 
satellites. For the purpose of providing a backdrop for the discussion 
on emerging security arrangements, it is to the "Two plus Four" talks 
that we now turn.
The "Two plus Four" Talks
In February 1990, the two German states concluded an 
agreement with the Allies of World W ar II (the U.S., Britain, France, 
and the Soviet Union) concerning their remaining legal rights within 
the "Two-plus-Four" negotiations. It was determined that the two 
German states would be responsible for the internal dynam ics of 
their reunification and that international aspects would be addressed 
by the Four Powers.2
2 V erheyen, op. o il., p. 191.
The "Two-plus-Four" negotiations were not only significant for 
the formality of returning Germany to full sovereignty. There was 
also a symbolic meaning to the talks that was directed at Europeans, 
and indeed the Germans themselves. Both the Europeans and the 
Germans needed to know what would be expected of them in the 
new Europe. As Peter Ludlow has stated, the negotiations
...reflected the need o f  the two Germanies to reconcile their own  
am bitions and internal necessities with the interests o f  Europe as a 
w hole. The fears that the prospect o f  a reunited Germany awakened  
am ongst its neighbors and partners were never far from the surface.
For this reason...they were a vital part o f  the unification process itself, 
which, as the Federal Chancellor and the Foreign M inister and indeed  
all leading German politicians constantly m aintained, could only be 
achieved and sustained if  it was seen as a step towards the creation o f  a 
new , p eacefu l European structure rather than a potentially  
d esta b ilis in g  d e v e lo p m en t.2
O f the Four Powers, only the Americans ardently supported 
Germany's reunification. The U.S. was undergoing a com prehensive 
reassessment of its own global role. American policy makers in 
Washington and Bonn agreed that in the emerging order in Europe, 
strong ties with Germany were critical. As the single strongest 
member of the European Community, the Germans were welcomed as 
equal par tne rs .4
Although the British and French were initially cool towards the 
prospect of German reunification, their reservations waned in the 
face of staunch American support and the unexpected advocacy of 
the European Community's institutions. Jacques Delors, the European
2 Peter Ludlow, "The German-German negotiations and the "Two-Plus-Four"
talks," in W olfgang Heisenberg, ed., G erm an  Unification  in E uropean
P e r s p e c t i v e ,  Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 1991, p. 20.
4 Ibid., p. 22.
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Commission President, developed close personal ties with policy 
makers in Bonn which resulted in a series of strongly supportive 
statements about G erm any's  impending reunification:
We seek the strengthening o f  the state o f  peace in Europe in which the 
German peop le w ill regain its unity through free se lf-d eterm in ation . 
This process should take place p eacefu lly  and d em ocratically ...in  the 
perspective o f  European integration. The Community is and must 
remain a point o f  reference and influence. It remains the cornerstone 
o f  a new European architecture and w ill permit the further 
developm ent o f  a range o f  effec tive  and harm onious relations with the 
other countries o f  Europe.5
In light of these and other constructive comments from the 
multinational Commission, the British and in particular the French 
(whose fellow countryman Delors headed the Commission) were
pushed into a constructive stance on German reunification.
The Soviet Union was understandably the least pliable o f  the 
Four Powers. The prospect of allowing a rapid reunification of 
Germany was an unattractive option both for Soviet leaders and for 
the Soviet population, in whom the memories of the sacrifices of 
W orld War II loomed large. As impetus for German unification 
gained steam in December 1989 when Soviet Foreign Minister
Eduard Shevardnadze, in a speech in Brussels, stated that "it is
necessary to proceed on the basis of the post-war realities, namely, 
the existence of two sovereign states...a retreat from that would be 
fraught with destabilization in Europe."6
The Soviets were hesitant, as a victorious power of World W ar 
II, to renounce legal rights in East Germany. The question of what
5 Ibid., p. 23.
6 Ibid., p. 21.
alliance the new Germany would be a member of, and by extension 
what the role of Soviet forces in East Germany would be, proved to 
be the most difficult negotiating points for the Soviets. Yet, two 
events in July 1990 provided conditions amenable to a compromise. 
The first was the NATO summit in early July in London "which 
redefined the role of the alliance in European security and called for 
a new relationship with members of the W arsaw Pact".7
The second event was a bilateral agreement between Kohl and 
Gorbachev in mid-July. Gorbachev agreed to full German 
sovereignty, including the right to NATO membership. All Soviet 
forces would be withdrawn by 1994. In return, Kohl committed to 
reduce the level of German military forces to 370,000 and to help 
pay for the withdrawal of Soviet troops in East Germany.8
In September 1990, the foreign ministers of the two German 
states and their counterparts met in Moscow to sign the "Treaty on 
the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany". This agreement 
restored full sovereignty to the Germans and led to a formal treaty of 
friendship and cooperation between the G ermans and the Soviets.9 
The main body of the final settlement covered five points: 1) 
territorial issues--the external borders of the new Germany would be 
the external borders of the FRG and GDR; 2) the non-aggressive 
character of a new G erm any—constitutional provisions prohibiting 
the preparation for an aggressive war; 3) Germany's renunciation of 
the manufacture, possession and control of nuclear, biological, and
7 Ibid., p. 25.
8 Ibid., p. 25.
9 Verheyen, op. c il.. p. 203.
chemical weapons (coupled with a pledge to reduce troop levels to 
370,000); 4) bilateral arrangements for the withdrawal of Soviet 
armed forces from German territory; and 5) undertakings regarding 
German troops on the territory of the former G D R —until Soviet forces 
were completely withdrawn, the new Germany would only assign 
German territorial defense units which were not part of N A T O .10
M ainta in ing  the Atlant ic  Link
For over 40 years the bipolar order induced a tense but 
effective stability on the European continent. Throughout the Cold 
War the threat of previously unimaginable destruction on both sides 
prevented the outbreak of war. Today, however, the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union and the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact has 
deprived NATO of its primary function: to act as a Western security 
bulwark against the Soviet Union. While few would question NATO's 
stabilizing influence in the Cold War, many analysts argue that NATO, 
like the Warsaw Pact, has lost its utility in light of recent 
d e v e l o p m e n t s .11
However, NATO has traditionally "had to perform a triple 
function: to keep the Soviet Union out, the Germans down, and the 
United States in; or in other words, to meet the threats and 
challenges posed by Soviet power and harmonize relations between 
the European members of the Alliance, while deferring ultimate
10 Ludlow, op. cit., pp. 26-27.
11 Heisenberg, op. cit., p. 111.
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defense responsibilities to the United S tates."12 The changes in the
international environment in Europe now demand a security
structure that can meet any military threat from successor states of
the former Soviet Union and, more critically, continue to promote
harmony between European countries. The U.S. presence in Europe
remains useful to reassure Europeans, but the redefinition of security
in the wake of the bipolar order away from one of rigid East-W est
tension requires new structures which provide Europeans with
greater participation in determ ining their security future.
A dramatic alteration of N ATO ’s role in European security
seems necessary. Numerous proposals exist for revamping NATO to
fit the current demands of European security, in which greater
political concerns are addressed and the traditional East-W est
conflict orientation is altered. Wolfgang Heisenberg has noted that
the debate over which direction the Western Alliance should proceed
has resulted in a vast number of proposals:
Many o f  these go w ell beyond evolutionary reform, in particular pro­
posals to transform the alliance into a primarily politica l institution, 
or to g ive it an "all-European" character by incorporating into it the 
East European states or even the Soviet U nion .13
For Germany and other Europeans, NATO has also fulfilled 
another role: that of providing containment of Germany within the 
Western Alliance. As Wolfram Hanrieder has noted:
12 Anne-M arie Le Gloannec, "Change in Germany and Future W est European 
Security Arrangements," in Gary L. G cipel, cd., The Future o f  Germ any,  
Indianapolis: Hudson Institute, 1991, p. 130.
13 Heisenberg, op. cit., p. 111.
A central feature o f  allied and especia lly  American p o lic ies towards the
Federal Republic in the postwar era was the intention, only  
superficially a paradox, to make the W est Germans free and at the same
tim e not free: free with respect to the personal liberties and 
constitutional safeguards that are the essen ce o f  a dem ocratic political 
order, but not free to form ulate and im plem ent an independent foreign
p o l i c y .1 4
In the current European security climate the m aintenance of 
NATO and the Atlantic link no longer serves the purpose o f  keeping 
Soviet armed forces at bay. However, a NATO and American
presence in Europe can still be justified by offering an additional
restraint on reunited Germany's military forces, and insurance 
against the possible threat of turmoil in Russia that could overflow 
into Europe. The utility of NATO is perhaps best seen in a political 
light, as it represents a form of stability to Eastern European 
countries whose leaders "believe that N A TO ’s existence makes their 
neighborhood more stable, a perception that it can moderate actions
in times of tension."14
German leaders have ironically been the staunchest advocates 
of a continued American military presence in Europe. Although this 
can be partially attributed to Germany's gratitude for A m erica’s 
unhesitating support for reunification, it also suggests that there will 
be areas in which German interests coincide more closely with those 
of the Americans than with the British or French. As Elizabeth Pond 
has noted:
14 W olfram Hanrieder, "Germany, the N ew  Europe, and the Transatlantic 
C onnection," In tern a tion a l Journal', xlvi, Summer 1991, p. 397.
14 Jenonne W alker, "The Changing American R ole in European Security,"
H a rv a rd  In terna tiona l R eview ,  vol. xiv, no. 1, Fall 1991, p. 24.
Germany w ill value its augmented influence in European cou n cils  
arising from its American connection in NATO. Indeed it is natural for 
Germany to want to retain NATO's military prowess and practiced  
political crisis management. It is an ex isting  institution that can 
perpetuate the American habit o f  p o litical engagem ent in E urope...It is 
a forum that Europeans trust and understand. The Germans and the 
B ritish—as w ell as the former S ov iet R ep ub lics—realize that 
m aintaining NATO is the only way to keep the Americans in Germany, as 
all wish to d o .15
While NATO's (and by extension the United States') continued 
presence can be justified, it is clear that NATO "will not be central to 
Europe's new security problem s."16 This is a consequence of a 
different security environm ent in which traditional security  concerns
such as nuclear confrontation and conventional arms stockpiling 
yield to ethnic strife and civil war as the most urgent security 
dilemmas. The fear of unrest in Eastern republics spilling over into 
stable prosperous Western Europe has superseded the fear o f  a
military invasion from the West.
For this reason it is important for Americans to support not 
only the Atlantic Alliance, but also the development of a European 
pillar of NATO, as embodied by the Western European Union (WEU). 
The "United States must swallow its reservations and support an all- 
European security compact, which would first augment and later
supplant the Cold War alliances by creating a stable and mutually 
acceptable framework for the legitimate interests of Germany, the 
Soviet Union, and their European neighbors."17 To ignore the benefits 
of an all-European peacekeeping force that can deal with problems
16 Elizabeth Pond, "Germany in the New Europe", Foreign  Affairs,  vol. 17, no. 2, 
Spring 1992, p. 122.
16 Walker, op. oil., p. 24.
17 Hanrieder, op. cit., p. 411.
that arise outside of N ATO ’s jurisdiction would be to deny the 
realities o f  the international environment.
Aside from NATO, there are two other existing forums which 
have the potential to establish a new security framework for Europe. 
One, the Western European Union (WEU), is being revitalized as a 
European pillar of the Atlantic alliance with an eye towards giving 
Europeans greater flexibility in conducting m ilitary-political business 
outside of NATO's jurisdiction. Central to the revitalization of the 
WEU has been the renewed impetus for Franco-German cooperation 
that has resulted in a "Eurocorps"—a jo in t Franco-German Brigade.
The other existing forum is the 35-country CSCE, which is the 
only organization which has a membership that spans the traditional 
East-West divide. While that body's lack of institutionalization (it 
has no secretariat, and recom mendations are made by unanimous 
vote) hampers its ability to manage crises, it does hold the promise 
that it could evolve into a collective security arrangement in Europe 
that includes both the United States and the Soviet Union. It is to 
this possibility that we now turn.
The CSCE
Although the artificial division of Europe was eradicated when 
the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989, there remained a natural 
partition between East and West. Due to widely divergent cultural 
and economic development in the post-war era, it will be difficult for 
any new security arrangement to meet basic requirements of both 
Western Europe and the nascent democracies of the East. As Robert
Hunter has noted: "In addition to the potential tensions caused by 
this difference between West and East in Europe, it is also clear that 
the two sides cannot soon share basic understandings, attitudes, and 
experiences that will enable them to develop an all-European 
security system that can meet basic requ irem ents ."18
The CSCE was an outgrowth of the 1975 Helsinki Conference, in 
which the signatories agreed to focus on three policy areas: military 
relationships, economic relations, and human r igh ts .19 Tw o factors 
provide promise that the CSCE could become an effective European 
security body. First, it is truly a pan-European body that 
incorporates nations from both sides of the continent. As such, it can 
provide a link to countries in the East which have no realistic 
prospect of joining the EC or NATO. Second, the issues it deals with— 
military, economic, and human rights—effectively incorporate  a 
broader definition of what constitutes "security" in the wake of the 
bipolar order in Europe.
The 1975 Helsinki Final Act represented an attempt to 
establish a multilateral security agenda which established 
confidence-and-security-build ing measures (CSBM s) that could be 
undertaken without regard to bloc affiliation. Such security 
measures included notification of major military m ovem ents in 
advance, the exchange of military observers, and the exchange of 
m ilitary personnel.20 While the Helsinki CSBMs were not legally
18 Robert E. Hunter, "The Future o f  European Security" The W ash ington  
Q u a r t e r l y , vol. 13, no. 4, Autumn 1990, p. 59.
19 Ibid., p. 59.
20 Manfred Efingcr and Volker Rittberger, "The CSBM R egim e in and for 
Europe: C onfidence Building and Peaceful C onflict M anagem ent," in M ichael C.
binding, they did lay the groundwork for an international regime in 
which parties to the agreements have access to information that they 
otherwise would not have access to, and it provided countries with a 
forum for creating and fulfilling expectations.21
The effectiveness of the CSCE and CSBMs during the Cold War 
was hampered by the fact that it had no authority to force 
com pliance among countries which were parties to the agreements. 
The nature of the ideological conflict between the Soviet Union and 
the United States superseded security concerns of smaller European 
countries. With the demise of the bipolar order, however, the CSCE 
promises to be the only institution which can effectively represent 
all European countries.
In November 1990, the CSCE Summit in Paris resulted in the 
establishm ent of a permanent institutional structure. Regular 
meetings of heads of state are to take place every two years, and 
foreign ministers are to meet annually. This institutional structure 
has allowed the CSCE to lay the groundwork for a collective security 
framework and provided an institutional mechanism for conflict 
prevention and crisis m anagem ent.22
Although there is widespread agreement am ong Europeans that 
the CSCE provides an excellent opportunity for a pan-European 
security framework, there are a number of obstacles. First, the CSCE 
operates on the principle of unanimity. Because all decisions of the
Pugh, ed., E uropean  S ecu r ity—T ow ards  2000.  New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, 
p. 107.
21 Ibid., p. 116.
22 Adrian H yde-Price, "Alternative Security System s for Europe," in M ichael C. 
Pugh, ed., E uropean  S ecu rity—T ow ards  2000 .  New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, 
p. 131.
CSCE must be approved unanimously by numerous countries with 
different security requirem ents, the organization 's  effectiveness is 
severly ham pered as an authoritative security structure. Coupled 
with this is the lack of a mechanism for enforcing its decisions. As 
Adrian Hyde-Price has noted, "Without an enforcem ent capability  
(ranging from diplomatic ostracism through economic sanctions to 
military force), no collective security arrangem ent can com m and 
c re d ib i l i ty ." 23
As in other security organizations in Europe, German support 
for and participation in the CSCE is critical to its success. While the 
U.S. and other German allies in Europe often tend to see Germany as 
breaking out of the carefully cultivated restraints of the EC and 
NATO, German efforts at strengthening the CSCE are designed to 
complement and not replace those organizations. When Chancellor 
Kohl proposed his "ten points" upon which German reunification 
could be attained in December 1989 (which events would quickly 
outpace), three of them referred to Germany's role in larger political 
organizations and frameworks. The eighth point identified the CSCE 
as the institution in which Germany would work closely to eliminate 
tensions of the past.24
The CSCE is what Robert Hunter calls "security neutral." It has 
"never been premised on a greater moral claim by one side or 
another to be secure. This neutrality with regard to security is all 
the more impressive against the background of past human rights
23 Ibid., p. 133.
24 Harald M ueller, "Germany," in In tegra tion  an d  S ecu rity  inW estern  Europe .  
eds. Mathias Jopp, et. al. Boulder, CO.: W estview  Press, 1991, p. 165.
discussions in which the Soviet Union and its allies were always at a 
m oral d isad v an tag e ."25 Through its pan-European and consensus- 
bound orientation, the CSCE is the organization that has the best 
opportunity  to underw rite  and m onitor fu rther confidence-build ing  
m e a s u re s .
Thus, the CSCE is a logical complement to NATO, the EC, and 
other European security organizations. Further institutionalization of 
the CSCE would help to create an umbrella organization which, 
together with existing institutions, will provide more opportunities to 
address crucial security issues than in the past. As Harald M ueller 
has noted, the change in the international climate provides a 
propitious opportunity  to reorder security structures in Europe:
The recent p ositive assessm ent o f  international law by the S ov iet Union  
should be taken seriously in the view  o f  the German governm ent. The 
CSCE is the appropriate forum within which such institutions can be 
developed. This requires the broadening o f  the mandate, creation o f  
permanent institu tions w ithin the CSCE fram ework, and the investm ent 
o f  som e authority in these new institutions. A foreign m inisters 
council, a secretariat, a verification  agen cy , a con flic t m anagem ent 
center, should g ive  the CSCE the character o f  a permanent organization  
concerned with m atters o f  European secu rity .2 6
The CSCE then can play a constructive role in European security 
by seizing greater initiative in the realms of arms control 
verification, refugee policy, human rights, and economic aid transfers 
from the West to the East. However, although it is an organization 
with a pan-European membership, it must act as a com plem ent to 
Western security structures already in place. It is with this fact in
25 Hunter, op. cit., p. 59.
26 Mueller, op. cit., p. 167.
mind that we now turn to an examination of the WEU and its efforts 
to carve out a greater role in providing for European security.
The WEU
As stated earlier, NATO has had to redefine its role in Europe 
but at the same time establish itself as an indispensable component 
for future European security. As NATO redefines its role in light of 
dramatic geopolitical change, one European security organization has 
an opportunity to break out of its subordinate role and provide the 
continent with a purely European defense organization. That 
organization is the Western European Union (WEU).
The ability of West Europeans to forge a viable security 
organization separate from NATO is critical to the establishment of 
greater political cooperation discussed in the last chapter. The rapid 
disintegration of the Soviet glacis in Eastern Europe has created 
special demands and obligations on the EC to take the lead in helping 
them make the transition to democracy and m arket economies.
W hile the multinational institutions of the EC have made tremendous 
progress in dealing with economic and welfare issues, they have yet 
to effectively converge defense and security policies. In order to 
help Eastern Europeans to the fullest extent, and to promote stability 
and integration in volatile areas of Europe, the EC must develop a 
security structure autonomous from NATO.
This will be difficult for West Europeans, whose security for so 
long has depended on American power in the NATO framework. As 
one com m entator has noted:
Until the revolution o f  1989, W est European security cooperation was 
a subordinate elem ent o f  the restructuring o f  the W estern A lliance.
In the wake o f  the breakup o f  the bloc system  and the em phasis on the 
1992 process, W est European security cooperation may w ell be placed  
at the vanguard role in creating the new Europe. Put in negative  
terms, if  Western Europe cannot create a com m on security identity, it 
may not be able to create the political identity so essential to the 
redefin ition  o f  sovereignty  in a m ultinational Europe.27
The WEU currently counts as members nine of the twelve 
countries in the EC. At the Maastricht meetings in December 1991, 
EC member states set up the provisions for a bolder and more 
flexible WEU to handle European concerns outside of NATO. Soldiers 
fighting in the WEU would fight under the banner of the European 
Union. Such a force would give the EC greater leeway in the event of 
crises such as Yugoslavia; NATO would continue to handle defense 
against an attack on one of its members.28 However, such a 
configuration of security organizations with different but sometimes 
overlapping functions would require some coordination through an 
inter-organizational agency. Such an agency could effectively 
identify  jurisdictional areas and prevent redundancy of security 
fu n c tio n s .
The imperative for an effective WEU is only now beginning to 
reveal itself to the U.S. Previously, American policy-makers saw the 
establishm ent of a separate European defense organization as a
27 Robbin Laird, The Europeanization o f  the Alliance.  Boulder, CO.: W estview  
Press, 1991, p. 125.
28 The Economist,  Dec. 14, 1991, p. 53.
threat to NATO. In effect, the U.S. was hesitant to provide a nuclear 
umbrella for defense policy that it did not write. However, as one 
com m enta tor has noted:
D evelopm ent o f  a coordinated European defense capability can now  
relieve the United States o f  what it has long felt was an ex cessiv e  share 
in the burden o f  m aintaining security in Europe. It can facilitate any 
further out-of-area exp ed ition s that a llies m ight d ecide are necessary. 
And, in the hidden agenda, it can make available European units with
U .S. log istics and in telligen ce that might be able to intervene in
em ergencies in the M iddle East and in nearby Eastern Europe.29
Thus, there is a strong strategic as well as political rationale for 
consumm ating the WEU.
Reinhardt Rummel has suggested that the em erging security 
framework for Europe will require clear guidelines for the roles of 
the WEU, NATO, and the establishment of European Political Union as 
envisioned by Maastricht. Much of the difficulty in establishing the 
common defense and security policy that the WEU would require is 
found in divergent national expectations. Thus, the complete 
transference of sovereignty in this area to Brussels is unlikely. As
Rummel notes, "National political leaders have drawn diverse
conclusions from external challenges such as the Gulf W ar or the 
instability in eastern Europe and the former Soviet U nion."30 In 
short, some countries, such as Britain, prefer not to actively pursue a 
common defense and security policy on the grounds that NATO 
provides adequate defense for Europe. On the other hand, France 
and Germany see the British stance as out of step with the changes in
29 Pond, op. cil., p. 124.
30 Reinhardt Rum m el, "Integration, D isintegration , and Security in Europe," 
In tern a tio n a l  Journal,  x lvii, no, 1, Winter 1991-92, p. 80.
Europe. These countries "think that if  this model were to guide the 
evolution of a common policy, the economic giant would be likely to 
remain a political dwarf and a military appendix."31
A central element to strengthening the "European pillar" has 
been the establishm ent of the "Eurocorps"—a Franco-G erm an military 
division. The French and Germans have long understood that their 
continued cooperation is at the heart of Europe's integration efforts. 
This understanding is derived from different goals on each side. For 
the French, outside NATO's military command, the WEU and the 
Franco-German brigade is a manifestation of "the desire to expand 
the European capability to take independent decisions com m ensurate  
with the French concept of security independence. For the West 
Germans, enhanced Europeanization has been desirable as a way of 
avoiding the constraints of the superpow er-dom inated East-W est 
s y s te m ." 32
The Eurocorps was established in the wake of M aastricht in 
order to support the treaty’s guidelines for European defense policy 
to be operated through the WEU. Membership is open to other 
European states and it is to reach full strength by 1995. Three broad 
tasks will be assigned to the Eurocorps: first, it will support NATO 
within the NATO area (thus, as the Germans claim, bringing France 
closer to NATO); second, it will back the WEU in non-NATO areas of 
Europe; and finally, it will take part in peacekeeping missions outside 
of Europe.33
31 Ibid., p. 81.
32 Laird, op. cit., p. 113.
33 The Economist, May 23, 1992, p. 51.
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These tasks present some difficult problems for German policy 
makers. First, it does present the specter of a clash of interests 
between Germany's role in NATO and the WEU. Second, while there 
is wide support in the Bundestag for German participation in the U.N. 
peacekeeping forces, the use of German forces outside NATO is 
prohibited by the Basic Law. The security role that Germany will 
eventually play is part of a larger issue o f  constitutional and political 
changes to be wrought by German reunification. As German defense 
minister Volker Ruehe has noted, "it could be a decade before 
Germany is psychologically ready for a wider 'out of area' military
ro le ."34
Thus, the development of the Eurocorps as a supplement to the 
WEU and NATO represents an attempt at linking successful Cold War 
security institutions with new attempts at forging a security 
framework that is more responsive to new security problems. The 
German role in this has been supportive of further integration at 
each level. By supporting political union and taking a lead in 
establishing close security ties with other Europeans, G erm any seeks 
to establish a European defense capability that reaches out to the 
countries of the East and emphasizes diplomatic persuasion over 
military deterrence. Robin Laird captured the essence of the German 
strategy as such:
In effect, the Germans would seek to W esternize the East and at the 
same tim e m aintain clear m ilitary and p olitical com m itm ents w ithin the 
W estern A lliance. The military effort would be characterized as a 
drawdown o f  ex istin g  forces and doctrine w hile the p olitical effort 
would be leading the dim ension for German security p o l i c y . 3 5
34 Ibid., p. 53.
35 Laird, op. cit., p. 119.
In the current European security environm ent, Europeans, 
together with the U.S. and Russia, are groping their way toward a 
new fram ework which accurately reflects recent changes in the 
international environm ent. W estern security has traditionally  been 
centered on NATO and has sought to fulfill three critical functions: 1) 
to protect Western Europe from the Soviet military threat; 2) to 
embrace the Germans closely within the Western alliance so as to 
allay fears of an assertive and independent West Germany; and 3) to 
ensure an American presence in Europe. The need for defense 
against a possible Russian attack has greatly diminished as Russia 
tries to enter the economic fold of the West.
However, with regard to NATO's latter two functions—acting as 
a restraint on Germany and ensuring an American presence in 
Germany—there is still a strong rationale for NATO's existence. That 
organization can act as a stable anchor of Western security as the 
continent proceeds to examine possible new security structures.
In addition to NATO, there are other existing institutions which 
can be adapted or revived to fill the security void and provide 
greater possibilities for the establishm ent of a pan-European security 
framework. The CSCE is at once the most promising and most 
difficult to adapt. It has the pan-European membership that any 
comprehensive security system will require; it also has the capacity 
to address new security concerns outside the confines of the 
traditional East-W est conflict such as human rights and economic
issues. However, before the CSCE can evolve into a truly effective 
and credible security organization, it must be endowed with greater 
institutional authority and an ability to make its decisions binding on 
its members.
The WEU also has new-found promise for strengthening the 
Western security fabric. With the renewed impetus of political 
cooperation prompted by the Maastricht Treaty, the WEU will seek to 
exert itself as a European pillar within NATO. It will attempt to 
serve European defense and peacekeeping needs that are outside 
NATO jurisdiction; in doing so, it will seek to exert a common 
European voice in security and foreign policy that has thus far 
eluded the EC.
A significant element of this European effort to speak with one 
voice is found in the establishment of the Franco-German Eurocorps. 
This corps represents an attempt by the French and Germans to 
promote political cooperation and spur the WEU to assume a greater 
responsibility for European defense that is com m ensurate with 
European economic power. While the WEU and the Eurocorps 
present unlikely but possible clashes of interest with NATO, both 
German and French policy makers assert that the development o f  a 
separate and more flexible European defense capability will not 
undermine existing security structures, but rather augm ent them in 
an attempt to respond to the current security environment.
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Conc l us i on
The liberalization of Eastern Europe and the ensuing German 
reunification has vindicated the pattern of W estern European developm ent 
in the post-war era. The anchorage of the West in institutions such as 
NATO and the EC and their firm com mitment to free-market principles 
created a unified position against the Soviet Union and its Eastern 
European satellites. While there were often serious differences among the 
West as to economic, political, and security strategies, these institutions 
ensured an unprecedented period of stability and peace in Europe.
However, amid the euphoria and optimism for a new Europe there 
are numerous significant challenges. Certainly the greatest of the 
challenges is to continue to strengthen the integration of W estern Europe 
so that region may guide Eastern Europeans through the difficult transition 
to democratic government and free-market economies. The role of 
Germany is central to this mission.
Due to its geopolitical location, economic might, and its historical ties 
to the East, Eastern Europeans naturally look to Germany for economic and 
technical assistance. It is understandable, given the Germans' history, that 
Europeans on both sides of the East-W est divide eye German reunification 
with concern. However, old assumptions must not outweigh current 
political realities. After over 40 years as a vital member of the Western 
community, Germany will remain committed to a vision of Europe which 
em phasizes c loser  integration.
The character of European integration has changed dram atically  in
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recent years. In its embryonic stages, the EC was envisioned by its 
creators as an institutionalization of an inexorable p ro c e s s -o n e  which 
would gain momentum and spill-over into all aspects of society. While this 
integration would be initiated in technical and economic fields, the success 
of these experiments would eventually produce similar dynam ics in the 
political realm.
However, this was clearly a utopian vision of what integration could 
accomplish, and at what speed. After early successes, the integrative 
schemes faltered in the face of national governments which saw little 
benefit in yielding to supranational organizations the nation-state 's  
greatest asset: its ability to use force. Integration, it seemed, would not 
work after all. There was simply too much national opposition.
However, with time the supporters of European integration adapted 
to national opposition by developing a more flexible approach to promoting 
integration. These supporters recognized that cooperation and integration 
could be enhanced not only through automatic spill-over from various 
technical realms, but from cultivating spill-over through diplom atic 
negotiation. This enabled the integration process to continue 
incrementally, and it offered a potential solution to the obstinacy of 
n a t io n - s ta te s .
Germany has played a central role in this "new dynamism" of the EC. 
Adenauer first broke with the traditions of German foreign policy by 
firmly committing Germany to the West and European integration. This 
gave both the West German state and the West German people a new 
orientation as members of the Western community. There was for the first 
time a strong sense of identification with Western economic and political 
va lu es .
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As Germany's economic stature increased, so too did its role in the EC
rise. With a firm commitment to multilateralism and closer integration in
Europe, the Germans gradually rose to a leadership position within the EC. 
With reunification, that role has been consolidated. The German efforts at 
increasing monetary and political union at the M aastricht 
intergovernmental conferences dem onstrate that Germany is both willing 
to subjugate a hallowed national symbol in the Deutsch mark, and to take 
the lead politically as it did in the case of the Yugoslavian crises.
The same is true in the security realm. The centrality of Germany's
role in constructing a new security apparatus is obvious. As in other issues
discussed in this thesis, Germans have assiduously cultivated cooperation 
among existing institutions such as NATO and the CSCE. Germany’s support 
for a continued NATO presence and its support for a further 
institutionalization of the CSCE as a pan-European solution dem onstrate 
that the Germans are quite cognizant of the value of multilateral security 
organizations. Because of this, they will remain committed to increasing 
confidence-building and security measures in both W est and East.
For some time, Europeans will continue to look askance at the 
Germans. While it is true that domestic developments in Germany should 
be closely watched, it should also be recognized that the Federal Republic 
has proven itself a vibrant democratic state. As such, it will act as other 
major pow ers—with a strong voice on international matters and with the 
resiliency of a strong democracy to overcome internal crises. This should 
mitigate concern of a return to Germany's unstable domestic, and thus 
international, political past.
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G l o s s a r y
Basic L a w —Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany.
C h r i s t i a n  D e m o c ra t ic  U n io n /
C h r i s t i a n  Social U n ion  (C D U /C S U )—C onservative  catch-all parties 
established in the wake of World W ar II in the Federal Republic.
A denauer’s leadership of the CDU firmly established that party in the
electorate’s mind as the party of the “economic miracle” .
E u r o p e a n  F re e  T r a d e  A ssoc ia t ion  (E F T A )—organization  formed in
1959 to eliminate tariffs and other trade barriers among members.
(Austria, Britain, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland) 
Britain and Denmark joined the EC in 1973, and other members plan to 
apply for EC membership as soon as 1994.
E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i ty  (EC )--estab lished  in 1957, this organization seeks 
to promote integration and closer political cooperation among its members. 
(Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) Consists of three original 
organizations: European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), European Atomic 
Energy Commission (Euratom), European Economic Communitu (EC).
E u r o p e a n  C u r re n c y  U n it  (ECU )--European currency to replace all 
national currencies upon im plem enting European M onetary Union.
F re e  D em o cra tic  P a r ty  (FDP)--Coalition partner of both the CDU and 
the SPD in governments throughout post-war era. Like the CDU, it is a 
conservative party; however, it eschews the role of religion in politics.
H e ls in k i  p r o c e s s - t e r m  referring to the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Major 
diplomatic agreements on issues of security, human rights, and economic 
cooperation. Signed by 35 countries in Europe from both the East and 
W est blocs, neutral and nonaligned countries.
N o r th  A t la n t ic  T r e a ty  O r g a n iz a t io n  (N A T O )--es tab lished  in 1949 to 
provide security for North Atlantic area. Membership: Belgium, Britain, 
Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey and the United States. In the wake 
of the bipolar order, the organization is seeking a new political role for
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itself in Europe.
O r g a n iz a t io n  fo r  E c o n o m ic  C o o p e ra t io n
a n d  D e v e lo p m e n t  (O E C D )--estab lished  in 1961 to promote economic 
growth and freer trade among Western countries.
O s tp o l i t ik - -p o l ic y  of conciliation with Eastern Europe and a recognition of 
the division of Germany. Formulated by SPD M ayor of Berlin Willy Brandt.
S ingle E u ro p e a n  A ct (S E A )- -1986 agreem ent among EC m embers to 
establish a single market by the end of 1992. Laid plans for the 
elimination o f  physical, technical, and fiscal barriers to freer trade within 
the EC.
Socia l D e m o c ra t ic  P a r ty  (S P D )—Next to CDU, the largest party in the 
FRG. Desired neutrality for Germany in the early post-war era as an 
acceptable price for German unification.
W e s te rn  E u ro p e a n  U nion  (W E U )-a l l ia n c e  within NATO creating a 
“European pillar”. Established in 1955, the WEU was long subordinate to 
NATO. Maastricht Treaty proposals call for a greater role for the W EU to 
act as peacekeepers and defensive forces outside o f  NATO jurisdiction.
Source: Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary. 
Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio Press, 1988.
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